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ESSAY TOWARD A RERSORALISTIC THEORY OF VALUE
mitllne and Analyals
Chapter I . . Some Fundamentals in Personalistic Philosophy.
a. Introductory, The object of this essay is to inquire 
into the value phase of the philosophical world-view 
known as personalism.
h. Difficulty of defining: -personalism. peraohalism is 
not easy to define (iVoeoause personaliSts differ 
among themselves in various details, and (2)'becauBe 
Twa.'ny having the essentials of the viewpoint call 
themselves by other names.
c. Definition of personalism. Following Professor
Flewelllng, personalism may be defined as "that system 
of philosophy which views personality as the active 
ground of the world, and as containing in the mystery 
of Its own unique being the key to all the antinomies 
of metaphysics",
d. Facts which will help ^ understand personalistlq
emphases. Personalism maintains the unity and integrity 
of the""8elf against Humean sensationalism; the genuine 
indivlduailty of the self against absolute idealism; 
the reality and efficacy of freedom -and purpose against 
Spenoer*s cosmic evolution and German materialism; the 
possibility of metaphysical explaiatlon, as opposed to 
positivism.
e. Some fundamental tenets of personalism. personalism^ ^ 
Told's, as part of lts“dlBtinotive creed, that (l)reality
is that which can act or be acted upon; (3)thinker and 
thought are numerically different, and have their 
common ground in a supreme personality; (3)knowledge, 
i.e. orderly apprehension of reality^is possible through 
principles immanent in the mind, called categories.
The personalisms of the past have not givdn to the 
problem of the fundamental nature of value the attention 
it ought to have. And yet there is latent in the 
general ground of the system a germ which "when allowed 
to grow will exhibit distinct and characteristic features.
Outline and Analysis 10
4
Chapter II............. The Personalistic Theory of the Self.
D'eflPi'tiona and-descriptions. Typical characterizations 
of the self run somewhat as follows: —
Ladd: the being which is the subject of the objects of 
knowledge; the being which "has experience”.
Calkins: that which persists, which remains identical 
throughout changes in experience.
Bowne: that which thinks, feels, wills, and at the dame 
time is aware of itself as the "active and abiding 
subject"; which is never to itself an object, in the 
proper sense. Its self-identification is the best 
proof of its actual identity or persistence.
Hocking assumes the position stated above, but finds 
that the very fact that personality is so peculiarly 
an experience makes it hard to describe.
Leighton draws a distinction between ."self" and "person", 
a "self" being a "seer which, unseen, sees", and a 
personality being a socially developed self. Close 
examination reveals that for him both self and person 
have characteristics very nearly like the plain self 
of hie predecessors’ conception.
Mdnsterberg implicitly agrees with those 'just named.
Summarizing, the personalistic self is a primary fact; 
Is identical and persistent, active, free, .individual.
b. Ar^menta -for the existence .of a self. The penchant 
of the disciples of Hume to explain the self entirely 
away, on -the one hand; ‘and the attempts by certain 
thinkers to explain it in terms of something conslddred 
more fundamental; on-the other; —■ these facts make it 
expedient for personallsts to prove, the existence of 
the self, as well a,s to define it.
Miss Calkins holds that the self is axiomatic, not 
subject to proof (nor, in practice, to disproof).
Ladd-thinks of knowledge as "self-realization"; the 
very natur.e of knowledge, therefore, -proves, the fact 
of the existence of the self.
Bowne argues from the nature of the judgment.. A and 
B could be brought together in the judgment, A is B,. 
only as a subject M brought them in the unity erf its 
consciousness. A judgment can not be explained in 
terms of its own form, or its 'own parts. Furthermore, 
the phenomenon of plurality'is possible only to a 
unitary perceiving mind. Simple facts such as these 
conclusively establish the fact of a self.
Outline and Analysis 11
(Chap. II, con.)
Differentiation from other theories. Personalismis 
legally descended from both English .^empiricism and 
German idealism.' Yet it is in many ways unllTse 
certain other offspring of the same ancestors.
(1) Ihereas the tendency of absolute idealism is to 
discount and depreciate the finite individual .
exalt the Absolute, personalism sees in him (the finite) 
a unique-and inalienable significance. The tendency 
of absolutism is to make the human person incidental; 
the tendency of personalism is to regard him as of 
cardinal importance.
(S) For a bet,t,er understanding of the contrast between 
personalism and the new realism, it is well to note 
clearly the prominent features of the realistic theory
of the mind. , . a* n ^First, then, the method: of introspection must yield 
to' the-method of observation of -minds as they dp^rate 
in the open field of nature and history, says realism. 
Moreover, it continues, the idea that minds are truly 
"inaccessible” must be abandoned. Now, realism forgets 
that idealists do not use the term inacces^ble in a 
full dictionary sense. A careful comparison -of Its own 
practice with that of idealism of the personalistio; 
variety shows that they are not so far apart, after -all; 
and that realism uses introspection 'just as much as a 
respectable and well trained idealism does.
' Secondly, realism leans ^heavily toward a •behavioristic 
conception of the self. Mind is "made to equal conduct 
plus the objects which conduct employs, or it is a 
"complex" so organized as to act interestedly. Its 
place is among the things that "just are". And so on. 
That is. the realistic conception of the self is 
characteristically self-forgetful, while the personalistio 
idea is just as characteristically self-aware.
Another difference lias, in the conception of space, 
time, and so-forth. We have' seen that personalism 
conceives them as categories of intelligence, whereby 
knowledge is organized. The new realism treats number 
and space.-and tiite as real Existences, "wholes" composed 
Qf »8lsments" which are revealed by analysis.
Outline and Analysis 12
a. Aspeots of experience or -reality included the
meSnlng of the term "value ’’, as ordinarfly understood. 
As Schiller has pointed out, We common asp^t” in 
every sort of valuation — whether economic ov 
ethical or logical or what not — is an a'^titude of 
welcome or the reverse toward items of experience.
b. Criticism or justification of the inclueion -of such
aspeotiT In spite of real”differences in We 
experience of food when one is hungry, and loyalty 
when one's relation is to the social group., and 
a certain type -of assent when a new idea is seen to 
harmonize with the totality of one's present system 
of moat significant ideas, there is underlying a 
real similarity — which lies in the common attitude 
of welcome or the reverse.
The history of thought contains many a debate on 
the rmitual relations of the varieties of value, and 
on the metaphysical significance of evaluations; but 
the fact of the welcome-attitude usually remains 
unchallenged.
c. Circumstances under which value-judgment occurs.
The consensus -of opinion among idealists, from-Lotze 
to Leighton, has been tha-t evaluations are not simply 
additions to facts, but that they are integral parts 
of the cognitive, process. ,Hor do the. neo-real-iats,. 
when their background is understood, offer' any 
necessary denial of; the poncluelon. Value-judgment,, 
in short, -i-s universal.
Chapter III...........Value-judgment and the Value Concept
Chapter IV . . Nature of the Value-judgment; Value and the 
Theory of Knowledge.
a. Presentation and evaluation of the theories of selected 
schools of thought,
(ij To the pragmatist, knowledge is a "leading toward" 
reality. On this "basis, the fundamental species of 
value-judgment is the cognitive.
Value is a term which indicates in what way knowledge 
is a function of experience.
Outline and Analysis 13
j[Chap. '17, con. )
The "attainments of knowledge" are tentative, 
forever -suh^eot to revision. Eternal 'tr.nths are 
fairy creatures, not rea*! fleah and "blood. . The 
test of truth and falsehood is "workahildty", in 
the conclusions of aesthetide, ethics,^ and every-’ 
thing else.
Personalism agrees with pragmatism*-regarding- 
the tentative natura of particular human -conolusdons. 
But it disagrees on the nature of kno.wledgg; ^ for 
Toragmatism, knowledge is- a function of experience; 
for personalism, it is an orderly arrangement of 
experience'after the pattern of categories immanent 
in the mind of the p-otive self.
(3) Neo-realism contends that the propeas denominated 
knowledge leaves things unchanged in their assential 
character. Ideas do not represent; they present.
When ,a.thing enters into a specifi-c form of relation, 
knowledge occurs.
Things exist, hut relations sphsist. Among^ the, 
latter are included logipal laws, and ethical values; 
Truth, "beauty', goodness do not depend upon persons — 
they are ultimates.
For the personalist, it is significant that neo­
realists do not stick consistently to th‘e o"byioua 
implications of their theory^ but allow a taoit* uSe 
of selfhood in attacking practical problems of value.
(3) Absolute idealism makes the Infinite the only real 
and conplete self, but allows that He shares His 
elmental experiences with finite selves. And the laws, 
of consciousness, logic, are the laws of nature. *
In an act of judgment by the Absolute, subject and 
predicate are identical — the judgment is true; but 
a judgment by a finite person only approximates 
identity* No judgments are wholly false; some 
approximate more nearly, some less nearly, to the 
full measure of t^uth. If -all judgments ^enTdebe 
brought together, they would makp a-grand ultimate 
synthesis, since all are fragments of thp experience, 
of the Absolute.
And value-judgment8 are fragments of this sort.
Outline and Analysis 14
(Chap, IV, con. )
'(4) Six idealists.
TTJ Mansterherg ’’take's evaluation to be an-act 
of an agent, will.
He denies, as against subjectivism, that pain 
or pleasure affect the true value-judgment. The 
latter is an act ^of "pure« vflll.
As against absolutism, evaluations are more 
than mere fractions' o:f 'an. Infinite Experience.
As against pragmatism, he contends' that values 
are more than relative .in both quality and 
significance.
.(B) Implicated in the position of Adams is the 
belief that tha study of the value-judgment is 
fruitful in proportion to one*8 recognition of 
the Inseparability of knowledge and value.
(0) Hocking makes value-judgment "a way of knowing 
objects with one*s whole-idea". The act of 
evaluation is undeliberate, effortless, natural.
It is not confined to the operation of cold reason, 
but pervades the activity of the mind.
(B) For Pringle-Pattison, evaluations just as truly 
as sense-perceptions put one in touch with reality. 
The act of value-judgment is in its nature not a 
case of private ‘mental calisthenics, but a genuine 
instance of apprehension.
(E) Sorley plainly erects values into, a third order 
of reality, co-ordinate with existents and- relations
In his thinking, value^judgment implies the- 
existence of persons in whom intrinsic values inhere 
and co-me to realization; and things, which-have an 
instrumental value.
Moral values are very important in his philosophy
(F) In Leighton/s system, evaluations are one 
species of the activity of the. self.
They sustain a relation to "an objeotdve onier, 
and may not- therefore he discounted as illusion or 
idiosyncrasy.Human evaluations are a reaching toward, ever 
coMng closer to attainment. Man increases in 
wisdom.
Outline and Analysis 15
fOhap-. IV, ,Gon. )
■b. The theory of value as a category. , Personalism 
takes from Kant 'the'^ootrine of the categories as 
principles according to which the mlnd'Ord.ers ite 
experiences. Ko hard and fast e-greement has 
"been reached as to their number and names, although 
the fact of categories is usually accepted.
My purpose Is to support the thesis that VALUE 
IS A CATEGORY, in the epistemological sense.
Personalisms have long been groping in this 
direction. Lotze almost makes moral value a form 
of the organization of knowledge. Bowne’a ethical 
discussions contain the germ, but do not develop It, 
as also do Prlngle-'^attlson and Sorley. Yet, until 
Leighton (1932) the theory is not made explicit.
He actually does treat value along with other 
"types" of the supreme category. Order.
The-argument in support of the thesis ete, briefly: 
first, that along with the is'-nesa of every mental 
event there is an accorananying ought-hess or ought- 
not-ness; secondly, there is no state of consciousness 
which lacks its ought-ness, any more than its is-ness; 
thirdly, however much disagreement thbse ever has been 
or will be, on value-ultiraates, -the value-form of 
common experiences forever remains; and finally, every 
definition of value is circular. Sinae these things 
are true, VALUE MUST BE A ^CATEGORY.
C. Some possible criticisms of the theoryj and repli_es
thereto^ Barring criticisms o.f the theory which are 
based on a naturalistic or realistic initial bias, or 
any of their kindred, three possible objections arise.
To the pragmatist's suggestion that value is a 
"fundtiorr" of knowledge, the answer is that the very 
concept of value as a function depends upon a-value 
category in the formation ot the concept.
The second and third objections grow out of the ^ 
supposition that adoption of the theory of categories 
means swallowing Kant whole. One criticism might 
be that the Kantian division of reality is rejected,
" hence the category theory 'goes by default. Reply-: 
the latter may stand even though -the fdrmer falls.
The ebhendariticisffi might be a request for proof that 
the value category is necessary to any rational thought 
whatsoever. And the answer is, that I do not argue 
for value as the necessary category, but only for the 
fact that it is one of the forms actually present.
Outline .and Analysis 16
(OhaiD. IV, con. )
A fourth oriticism might come from one who 
regards categories as forms "imposed upo'n" things 
by th'e perceiving subject; hence, frealcishhess.' 
But if the category be similar in all mind-e, the 
objection no longer “holds.
Chapter V . . . Objectivity of Vdlue; Value and Metaphysics.
The' metaphysical nature of value is an age-long puzzle. 
Tlodern debate centers in two chief questions, namely, 
as to the nature of values, and as to their ultimate 
slgnlf icaiice.
a. Presentation and evaluation of theories of selected 
~Bchool8~oi^tH^ght.
(1) Absolute idealism. Royde offers a theory of the 
affirmation of evil (by the Supreme Person) in such a 
marmer as to make for greater good. Temptations are 
pictured as opportunities to endure, consequently as 
goods in disguise.
To this position I object, "Then why is temptation 
sometimes allowed to degrade?" And I ask for' 
Information, ^Are values in their'essence ways in which 
the self acta?" Clear answer's to both are needed, 
yet clear answers do not appear in Royce.
Bosanquet follows the absolutist hypothesis until 
he virtually reaches "indifferehtism towards evil".
Against the subjectivism of the Sophists, absolutism 
. dignifies and establishes values; against pragmatism, 
it replaces perpetual development with full growth; . 
against naturalism or materialism, it relates values 
to personal life.
But it does not' go far enough.
(2) Materialism. The tendency of materialistic thought 
has been to deny the existence of values, or to -make 
them empty and meaningless. perhaps the manifest * 
futility of' trving to explain the acknowledged fact cf 
evaluation has" Influenced the present-day avoidance of 
sheer materialism in thd b^st philosophical circles.
At any rate, materialism can not answer the two questions.
Outline and Analysis 17
(Chap. V, con,)
(3) Pragmatism. The tie that hinds pragmatists 
together is the theory of cognitive values. Out­
side this one point, they eXpeot di^ergsjoes,
James agrees with idealists in connecting -values
with sentient life, with minds.His theory of the nature of objectivity is copied 
from Berkeley's esse eat perclpl.. The orlgih of 
values is in the activity ofhuman thought has power to create, in the sense of 
taking the given and building it out — thoUoht 
can create values, in this sense.
On the question of the ultimte 
sisniflcanoe pragmatisn? itsbibf is irrelevant, ft^ffer hSlp on the subject of cognitive values?
The test of the truth of an Idea, we are told, 
lies in its ability to get 4s into satisfactory
relations with dther parts of -^agiSp
we are not told how to reach a principle o- S^agin^ 
the entrs-noe into satisfact'ory relation . 
entrance reveal Itself by consistency, or by corres-
^°’^PragmatiL’"auppllee -no serious help toward the 
solution of our puzzles.
(4) avowed interest is in the field
Hle^«PrtnGinia Ethica", however, has very clear
' ,1”
and truth as Independent entities, 
neo-realistio philosophy is unmistakably 
choice And notwithstanding occasional ,?rom consistency, his conclusion remains realistic.
(B) Russell's "Mysticism and ^^yet^thr
fobl tfe^rp^re%ttrto? hfp«url|-g to
of usefulness to consistency as f. '
while on the whole it entities, which
rather than thoroughgoing.Jeallsra.
Outline and Analysis 18
(Chap. V, con.)
(C) Perry is selected as a,representative of 
American neo-realism.
He considers value "a function oS desire".
In its nature it is an attribute of. a thing 
toward which the organism exhibits ah 
acquisitive attitude.
on the question of objectivity, his trend 
is to the conclusion that things are indep­
endent of vailues, but not vice versa; and that 
values are something added to things.
In short, realism seems not be be thoroughly 
at ease when the subject of Values is involved,
(5^ Idealisms. It is oharaoteristlo of peraonallems 
and near-personalisms to incorporate fundamentals 
concerning value in their metaphysical theories.
(A) For Lotze, the origin of value is in the will 
of the Supreme Person.- Values are infused into 
the forms and events of the universe by the 
Creative Act; man may dlsc6ver them and mahe 
them real in himself. They are objective, because 
their ground is outside finite creatures.
(B) Mdnsterberg regards the nature of value and 
the validity of value-judgments central questions 
in philosophy.
Hie contribution toward the solution of our 
problem lies in-his argument that objective 
validity means legitimacy in the minds of two or 
more perceiving spirits.
(C) Hocking would find life irrational if values 
were only private and illusory.
He also follows the tendency of MSnsterberg 
just mentioned, regarding objectivity.
(D) Pringle-Pattieon does not make explicit his 
understanding of the nature of value. Does he 
conceive it as a "representation" of successful 
conation or purpose?On the subject of objectivity, however, he is 
clear. Values must have objective validity, or 
the phenomenon of human reaching-upward becomes 
irrational. Moreover, human nature will not 
allow values to perish — they must persist
Outline and Analysis 19
(Chap. V, con.)
(E) Regarding -the nature of value Sorley 
maintains^ firsli*, that values can not he 
predicated of the abstract, but belong to 
persons; secondly, that they are an order
'o’f reality distinct from'exlstents' and relatione. 
I 'question whether, using his arguments on 
the second point, one might not multiply the 
number of orders praeter nBceesitatem.
Like Mdnsterberg and Rringle-Pattison,
Sorley uses arguments for objectivity which 
are animated by his revolt against pragmatism 
and neo-realism.
(F) Value-contents, avers Leighton, may change 
or remain the same, finr any given individual.
But the actualization of personality requires 
that the self take the value attitude toward a 
content. If this value reaction be not of 
objective validity, then life is irrational.
As we have previously seen,, value is by 
nature a category of knowledge.
Metaohysical inpllcatipM Rl ^ ^ i
oateffory. We have already seen that the essential 
feature of the value experience is an attitude of 
welcome or the reverse; and that the psychological 
fact of value-judgment has always been admitted by
philosophy. ^ . ..
But what does the fact -imply, viewed from the
personallstic standpoint? ,
In answering the questlopi, care must needs be 
exercised to distinguish between the value-form and 
the products of value-judgment. . ^ 44.
We have seen that, to personalism, value is in its
nature a category of knowledge. .,,^^4. « ^Furthermore, value has objective validity. Nor 
• is it necessary, in arguing for the fact of an 
obleotivlty, to hypostasize value, as some have done. 
The same sort of object*ivity which attaches to any 
other category attaches also to value. ^ ^ ^ 
Positively, objectivity resolves Itself into 
commonness to two or more Individuals. And if, as 
has been shown, value-judgment is a universal factor 
in human knowledge, then its objectivity Is 
‘ question. Unless the form be common, ray neighbor 
and I could not talk in terms of value.
Particular value-judgments, though Incomplete, 
press onward. 'If there were no actual value-goal 
ahead, the pressing onward would Be Irrational.
Outline and Analysis 20
(Ohap. V, con.)
Subsidiary questions arise somev/bat as follows:
First regarding criteria of value. .However 
the term criterion is understood, value as 
categorical* in nature remains.
Secondly, regarding realization of values. 
Realization does not mean the "apprehension of 
entities out yonder, but approximation of 
particular value-judgments to the goal set by
^^^Thirdly, regarding value and religion. The 
two bear close relation. Systems of religious 
ideas are par excellence value-judgments.
Flnally7Teii:rding the origin and ground of value? PersoLlism finds both origin and ground 
in the will'of the Supreme Person.
Chapter VI ..
Value and Certain Other Categories
a.
BeinE I do not agree to ■mnsterberg's adaptation 
term value to cover every species of act of
"^’'kereas he makes being a. variety of value. I view 
and value both as categories kir do r-acoept-Sn apparent implication in ■
are concomitant: but there is no logically neLssa?rconnectlon - they are in essence 
mutually Independent.
" • in^SrrkaSKafivf rSi^tk^bet^'ey
broughfioglther under the value-form?-, in a third 
""^kut^thffak is, not an eY°^?ber ^he^^rrowing
'-ofah rarn
what is essentially a product of the 
category of value.
Outline and Analysis 31
{Chap. VI, con.)
c. Quality. Quality as a category applies chiefly
totMngs as they affect the physical sensihility. 
Value has a broader application.
I do not agree with Leighton th^t value has 
no application in the physical realm.
Both categories have jurisdiction in both 
realms, yet each operates more extensively in 
one than in the other,
d. Time. The problem of the relationship between
value and time has always been full of subtle 
difficulty.
Sharp differences of opinion have existed 
on this problem.
Many of these difficulties would h8.ve been 
removed if the disputants had only recognized 
the categoirloal nature of value.
Pringle-Pattison treats time and value as 
though their relationship were a sort of need 
of the former by the latter. That is, values 
are ’’eternal” in the sense of ante-dating the 
universe.
Kant thiilks values ’’eternal” in the sense 
that they have no ending in time.
Sorley criticises a theory that time is the 
test of goodness.
Such arguments as the above depend upon a 
conceotion of values as a species of entities.
Wh'en it is clearly seen the men use plain 
metonymy in calling the products of value- 
judgments by the name of the principle of 
knowledge, then much of the debate appears 
pointless.
"Realization of value” is a metaphor to 
express a series of events apprehended by a 
value-judgment tending in a certain direction.
Leighton offers many helpful suggestions, 
although he fs^ils to develop fully some of hie 
latent implications.
Some of his ideas I use, bpt try to develop 
a little further.
Outline and Analysis 32
(Chap. VI, COE.)
r My own helief ie that values are neither 
things nor events.
But, as time has its hours and other divisions, 
so value has its goodness and heauty and truth.
And time no more affects beauty than an hour 
affects a line. Certain experiences are 
organized under both time and value forms, yet 
without the interference of -either category 
with the other. Logically, there might be 
truth, whether there were years or not.
The phenomenon described as "progressive 
realization of values" amounts to experience 
organlsied In accordance with time and value 
categories. But time is no metaphysical 
necessity to the progress.
It is racial habit which causes the linking 
of time and value in ordinary speech. TShen 
value is .knoto to be categorical in nature, 
questions concerning the temporality or the 
eternity of values lose their point.
e. Causality. In his argument against the relative
and illusory character of values, Sorley gives 
the impression that values are causally efficient.
Further reading discloses that he really 
attributes causal working to >illa.
My own position is that personalism needs go 
no farther than personality for its causes.
Hence, values are not (strictly speaking) causes.
Both causality and value are categories.
f. Pu.rpose. A necessitarian explanation of the
universe would preclude the possibility of 
value-judgment.
The ratio essendi of value-judgment is the 
shaping of purpose. Purposes mean-nothing 
unless they are founded on value-judgments.
Hence, the category of value is a logical 
prius to the category of purpose.
Outline and Analysis 83
Chapter VII.................... Summary and Conclusions.
Accepting the fundamental character of personality, 
with its uniqueness and activity and freedom, personal 
idealism is prepared to evolve a distinctive theory 
of value.
The term value applies to that aspect of experience 
which is desorihed as an attitude of welcome or the 
reverse, toward items of experience.
Valuations as psychological facts are universal.
For reasons enumerated, personalism concludes that 
VALUE IS A CATEGORY OF KTlOWLEDGE. Value is primarily 
categorical in its nature.
Moreover, value Is not private illusion; it is a form 
of knowledge, common to all persons. Hence, it is 
objective. And its origin is in the Supreme Person. 
The categories of being and quantity and quality and 
time and causality do "not have influence over" the 
category of "^alue. But value is a logical prius to 








SOME EOTDAIffiHTALS OT PERSOmiSTIC PHILOSOPHY
^ a- Introductory. The ohjeot of this as^ay-is exposition.
It is neither polemic nor apologetic. Always, the-dntentibn 
will he- to represent the position of thinkers who 'are^-criticised, 
in fairness .and without overlooking the. main currents of their 
opinions. jOiven a certain philosophical standpoint', the 
great -aim will ^^e to -study out implications, rather than to 
defend the, sta-lidpoint against all comers.
In particular, the problem is- to inquire concerning the 
side of the philosophical world-view which treats of the theory 
of values. ^ L
h. Difficulty of' defining personalism. The first
^ ^ ' 
necessity laid upon ua is that of defining personalism. For,
as G, E, Moore has expressed himself, one of the most serious
difficulties in all branches of philosophy is the failure to
make meanings clear and to define questions at issue beyond
the point of reasonable doubt.^
On the other hand, one must not forget the caution that 
first-grade philosophy does not content itself with acquiring 
«the art of affixing labels". Ho very wide acquaintance 
with the history of thought is needed to bear out the conclusion 
that labels rarely tell the whole, truth about any particular
1. G. E. Moore, "Principia Ethica", p. vii .(preface)
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thinlcer.S Tags may indicate selected elenients which are 
common to two or more students of philosophy; but it Is 
forever true that aside from the selected points .which the 
ta^s signify a greater or less divergence usualjly appears. .
Thus, one difficulty in the way of clear definition of 
personalisrri is that pronounced divergences are to be found 
among the systems of those who, acknowledge themselves to be 
personallets.
And a second difficulty is like unto It; some who have 
the identification marks .pf personalism call themselves by 
other names. So Hocking can protest of his system that 
"it is realism, it is mysticism, it is idealism also, its 
Identity, I believe, not broken."^ And Leighton, in his 
recent work on metaphysics, may conceive hie standpoint as 
dynamic ideal^.sm,'^ Yet both .hold to fundamental hypotheses 
which the personallst considers distinctive marks of his own 
system.
Or again, the study of such men as M'Taggart, Euchen, 
and others classified by professor .Brightman as "near- ^ 
personallsts" shows how hard beoomps the task of the mere
label-fixer. 5
Whoever, then, would set himself to the defining ox
3. Cf Leigh-ton. ”Man and the Cosmos", p. vili (preface)
3. Hocking, "Meaning of God in Biman Experience", p.
4. Leighton, loo. oit. p. vii
5 Art "The Unpopularity of Personalism", in Methodist 
R^vi^! vol! xxxvii P.ieseq. (January 1931)
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personalism must needs offer Ms definition in a spirit 
of meelcness. But, iie must needs define,
c. Definitions of personalism. Professor Flewelling 
defines personalism as " that system of philosophy which 
views personality as the active ground of the world, and 
as containing in the mystery of its own unique being the 
key to all the antinomies of metaphysifas".^ Its starting 
point is the Immediatenees of self-coneciouanessj it asserts 
a system of selves related through a supreme personality; and 
its characteristic features are to he found in its doctrine of 
reality, of knowledge, and of space and tlme.*^
Although he does not defind personallem'^hy that name, 
Arthur Kenyon Rogers, in his survey of «Ehglish and American 
Philosophy since 1800", takes account of a movement which 
instead of connecting value with an Ahqplute,, looks toward 
the finite person for its clue to the Interpretation of the 
basal constitution of reality.8 And he doee.recognize a 
species of theory which he terms "theistlc idealism", ajid 
which is best elaborated in the writings of G. T. L?.dd and 
B. P. Bowne.® The differentia which marks it off from others 
of the same genus is the effo;rt to dispense, with the-
6'. Art. "Personalism" by R. T. Flewelllhg in Encyclopedia 
of Religion and Ethics (mstings, ed.) yol ix p.772
7. Ibid. p.771-773. Cf Bowne, "Personalism", p. vili
'(preface) et passim,
8, P.316 ' ’ '
9. P.322
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hypothesis of an independent matter and to think all reality 
as a *^coinmerc0 of minds".10 'This, In addition to Its 
emphasis on the self as containing within ItsBIif that Which 
is needed in order to renddr reality Intelligible. Use of 
a schema which does not include the noun'personalism prevents 
Rogers from defining it directly; indirectly, as it will he 
seen from the brief remarks of the present paragraph, his 
conception agrees in the main with that of Flewelllng.
Hence, I' shall take as a provisio'nal definition of 
personalism that pf FleWellihg, as sumnarized above, and 
proceed now to ■(a)call'‘attentlon to certain facts in the 
history of thought which will help to-^an-understandlng of 
the personalistic emphaeeej and (b)ei^lain in summary form 
some fundamental tenets,
d. Facts which will help to understand personalistic 
emphases. Personalistic philosophy, as we know it, has 
pretty largely taken shape within the past half century.
Like any other great movement of thought, appreciation of 
it is heightened by turning attention to both contemporary 
and preceding tendencies.
Reacting from a sensational which spelled speculative 
anarchy, or chaos, Eant had rallied strong forces in support 
of the s^]Jremacy of reason. And under the leadership of 
Hegel the reaction went to the extreme of speculative despotism, 
known as absolute idealism. Against a sensationalism which 
would dissolve the Individual and hie experience into nothing
10. Rogers, op. cit. p.3S3
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more than, agglometations of conscious' states, and against 
an al5Bdlutism which would reduce ‘the self and its states 
and acts to mere phases of a 'Great All, personalism rose 
up to maintain the unity and integrity of the human self 
on the one hand, and its genuine individuality in spite of 
its finitenees on the other. As Flewelling puts it, it 
"occupies a mediating position between pure empiricism and 
pure idealism"
Furthermoi’e, there had‘been a considerable stir created 
by Spencer's theory, of cosmic evolution and by German 
materialf^, with their tendency to explain everything, 
human life included, in terms Substance-under-control-of- 
Law. Against 'these, personalism attempted to establish 
the fact of free human (and divine) spirits, in terms of 
whose character and acts thlngs-as-they-are are 'to be 
explained.
Once more: the occupation of a mediating position 
did not mean that personallste contented themselves with 
the spperficlalltlee of a naive Mind-15atter dualism, each 
element in the combination being regarded as independent 
and disparate, Neither did they ^rlft into positivistic- 
agnosticism. indeed, the typical personaliet spends no 
little energy showing that intellect will not be quieted 
by positivistic paregoric; and he takes pains to call 
attention to the untenability of naive dualism.
11. Op. cit.
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e.^Some fundamental tenSts-^of personalism. Flewelling 
asserts that personalism’ "is to be Judged-by its definition 
of reality-, its doctrine of knowledge, its' ooneeption of 
space^ and time. "^2
Reality is said to be that which can act pr be agjSed 
upon. Within this general principle there may be mljior 
variations, while the principle itself in its general form 
is accepted. For Instance, Miss Galkins thjLnks of ultilmate 
reality as being of the nature of self, or selves, whose 
property it is- to asseprt or recelve-.l^ Howlson, in his 
statement of philosophical cyeed, ascribes reality only to 
experiencer-rmlnds, and their experlenaes.^'^ Bowne argues 
that the essence of being is power of action, and.that the 
nature of a thing is to be expressed in its law of action.15 
Leighton, with his division of reality into orders denominated 
spatial-temporal, noetic, axlolpgical, views the univp^ee as 
a "system of Interactive and interpatient elements".
Sorjffe^, using a slightly different division into orders -- 
spirits, thing-series, values —r-assumps throughout his 
argument in the "Moral Values" that genuine reality acts or 
is acted upon;!'5' And so we might continue dowij the whole
12. Op. cit.'
13. QliLkins, "Persistent"Problems of Philosophy", "Ch. xi
*'esp. p,406-408
~ *■
14. Howlson, "Limits'of Evolution", xil, xlll
15. BOwne, "Metaphysics", p,16 eeq., 38, etc.
16. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", p,484, 467
17. Sorley, "Moral Values and the Idea of God", p.l90 seq.,
206-213
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list, ’But this 'much will suffice- to mice the point 'clear.
The second characteristic tenet 'concerns %he doctrine 
of knbwlfedge’, tt Is, In "bTlef, that the thought 'or hibntal 
etateife numerically other than that to which itt-^efe^;' 
that the thinker and the thing known have a common* source 
In' a supreme personality, and’ if it wdre not so knowledge 
would he irnposBihle.
The third point mentioned hy Flewelllng sho'Uld'propierry 
he treated alongside other subdivisions of the doctrine of • 
knowledge. Itoreover, -space and time are not the only 
categories on which personalism has a definite and characteristic 
theory; causality and purpose likewise receive exposition 
according to well defined viewpoints. As with the definition 
of reality, there are many minor varie-tions within a general 
principle accepted hy all. Space and time are conceived in 
the Fantlan sense of a priori principles immanent within the 
mind hy which It organizes the data presented to it.IS ^nd 
causality and purpose are intelligible only on an assumption 
of free, active selves who organize knowledge(partly)after 
the form of these categories.
One Identification mark of personalism I miss from
18, E.g. Howlson, "Limits of Evolution", p- xiii, 19-81,
46 seqo., etc.; Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos",
Ch. xvlil, esp, p.339,333, etc.; G. T. Ladd, 
"Introduction to Philosophy", p,348-S53, etc.;
BoTOe, "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", Ch, Iv, 
esp. p.66-70, 73-77, etc.
19. Bowne, Ihid. Of. p.89-99, 104-113; Ladd, Ihid.
Cf p.236-338; Cf Leighton, fhid. esp. p.191-203 
etc.
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Professor Flewelllng*s definition. That is the doctrine of 
value. The truth is. that in its revolt against, .the 
implications of both aensatlonalism and Spencerian cosmic 
evolution —^not to say materialism — moat peraonallstlc 
philosophy atte.ches -a peculiar value to the values. In 
the further development of the present essay this will become 
increasingly evident. For the moment, let us content our-, 
selves; with making a npte of the fact, possessing our .souls in 
patience at ,least until we have had an. opportunity to inquire 
furj^her intp the pereonalistic theory, of the self.
34
Chapter II
. THE' PERSONALISTIC THEORY OF THE SELF
4.
a. Definitions and descriptions. A& soon hs one enters 
upon the tash of comparing personalletlc definitions of the 
self, he becomes increasingly aware that bootless is' the* tash 
of the mere label-fixer. For while there are some elements 
of agreement in practioally all who hold to the main viewpoint 
of the school, each individual thinker has more or less 
numerous peculiarities in the details.
My object now will be to call attention to _the common 
elements in the several thinkers; mention of differences 
of detail is therefore to be regarded as only‘'incidental.
In* his chapter on "Philosophy of'Hature hnd Philosophy 
of Mind”, Ladd .argues from the .primary fabt of knowledge, 
itself indubitable, for the reality of a self or mind as the 
subject of mental states, experience, or whatever is the 
supposed object of knowledge.?*^ Ilowhere, however, does he 
come out dictionary-fashion in a definition; The nearest 
he approaches to it la in that statement that "whatever being 
has the actilal experience whose formula is co.gito ergo sum"
Is what he understands by a mlnd.^^ And the .most inportant 
predicate to be applied to stills Unity
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Miss Calkins is considerably clearer. She deecribee 
the self as that which per'eists 5‘r remains identical 
throughout all changes in exljerienceJ which Is dhlque- in 
the sense of not being interchangeable' with another -ol the 
group, as parts of a machine are* oftefi ihterohahgeablep 
which may Include in itself several ways of being conscious 
(as related to itself), and several other ways of being 
conscious (as related to other-than-itOelf).
Ahd Bbwne is better still, especially in the "Metaphysics". 
He speaks bf the self' as that which "thinks and feels and 
wills, and in this activity experiences and knows itself as 
the active and abiding subject of this i-niier life".
(Underscores mine).* It -^has neither spatial -form nor spatial 
relations; Is not properly speaking ah object, b'ut rather is 
"the subject which is the condition of all objects”.Its 
reality is neither in material substdhtiality, nor in-tihb 
Character of a phenomenon, 'but in the fact that it '!& ah 
agent with the ability to act*. It is’what Miss Calkins would 
call‘persistent, identical; but its identity is not that of 
a hlxed lump, nor that -of a flowing stream, -nor hny other 
creature intd the' conception of which time enters —
"Experienced identity he the only identity”, and its own
self-identification, an observed fact of consciousness, is
* .< '
33. G'alklns, ".Perslsfent Problems -of Philosophy", p.408-411
34. Bowne, "Metaphysics", p.330f
25. Ibid. Cf "Personalism" p.368-277 etc.
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the best proof of its actual identity or persistence.26 
In hie study of "Knowledge of other Minds.”, Hooking 
protests against the naive expectation that we can have 
physical knowledge of our own minds as we have of" natural 
objects, and against the supposition that my mind, can "cease 
to be subject in order to become an object".27 "Personality
ppean include law, as law cannot include personality" ; 
indeed, personality is difficult t'o describe, because it is 
so peculiarly an experience* Quite incidentally, in eaplaining 
the principle of alternation as it relates to mysticism, he 
remarks that’ th'e -power of voluntary attention is the specific 
mark of our Indlvldvial selfhood.29 Underlying this remark
and In^illoatBd in it is a concreption of the 'self as unique, in 
Miss Calkins' \inderstanding, and as Treely acting, in.Bowne's
way' of looking at dt. . ^
Leighton (if he be not read clean out of the ranks of
the personalists) offers an elaborately wrought theory of 
personality and selfhood. He draws a careful distinction 
between "self" and "person"; thus, the latter is a self, 
but- the reverse need not necessarily be true; for the self 
may fall short of actualized personality — it may never attain
more than potential personality.^*^
36. Bowne, "Metaphysics", p.331-344
37. Hooking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience", p.251 seq.
380 seq.
3B. Ibid, p.335. seq.
S|'. 'Ibid. P4412
30. Leighton, "Jian and the Cosmos", p.290
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Hie list of characteristics of the "self" coinpriees 
unity, hy which he means the same as Miss Caihlns* persistence, 
and Bowne*e identity; oompljsxlty, which is equivalent to 
Miss Calkins* Inclueiveness. and to some of the corollary 
Implications of Bowne*s identity; uniqueness, which again 
agrees with Mies Calkins; and relatedness to other selves 
and things, which is similar to hotheMlss Galkins and 
Professor Hocking,In an expression which thinly paraphrases 
the statements of Bowne, Hocking, and others, he describes 
the self as "the seer which, unseen, sees”,^^ In an illuminating 
chapter on the nature of the self, he refutes the demnd for 
a. self which can be spatially Inspected, or for one which has 
merely phenomenal or merely logical-convenience existence, his 
refutation following lines of argument common to personallsts.^^
At the end of the discussion, his summary discloses that not 
only has he acoampllshed the object Just suggested, but that 
he has also managed to show that the metaphysical conception 
of a self need^not, when rightly understood, conflict with the 
psychologist’s conception. Indeed, he shows more; namely, 
that without the "selective analytic and synthetic principle 
revealed in conscious activity, the biological individual 
would not be a true self".^^
31. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", p,S91 '(Compare
previous references to Bowne, Calkins, Hocking).
33. Ibid, p.303
33, Ibid. Ch, xxiii
34. Tbi-d. p.311 seqi
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On the other hand, -personal,!ty Is eome-^hing to he 
achieved; it la a .self developed through social culture 
or nurture.yet it la not the mere creature of historical 
forces and spcia,! institutions. It is no helpless lump of 
clay in the hands of an environment. Quite the contrary, 
it has the power to cast away or to assimilate its surroundings 
into the fabric of its owti being. Its development depande 
largely on itself.26
Selfhood exhibits three distinct phases; (a)the empirical 
or actual self, that ^which I experience and my neighbors, see; 
(b)the formal self or pure ego, -"the* active and enduring 
principle of synthesis which organizes the empjllioal elements 
of selfhood .into a unity and forms the-principle of continuity 
on which memory depends", and therefore is the. "basis 
consciousness of personal identity"'; (o,)the ideal self, which
equals "t.he self as develpping-personality".27
Parenthetically, it may be remarked that some of the- 
phrases and expressions used to describe the third phase of 
selfhood might easily lead the orit.ical reader to wonder 
whether the first and third phases were not very nearly identical, 
^pd again, the pattern for the analysis seems to be the 
Aristotelian matter and form.
After all is said and done, however, Leighton’s conception 
does not differ radically from that of other thinkers we have
35. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", exp. p.383
36. Ibid. Ch. xxvi, p.388, etc.
37. Ibid, p.353 seq.
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examined. Self and personality, metaphysically viewed, are 
not so different as at first appears, when the demands of 
logioal convenience axe uppermost. As we saw above, hi& 
list of characteristics follows very closely the lists of 
several predecessors and contemporaries.^^
Although Mdnsterherg's philosophy as a whole tends 
strongly toward the extreme of a Fichtean idealism, hie 
remrks on human selfhood or personality call attention to 
such features as unity, freedom, and purpoalveness — which
•7Q
agree with the pereonallstlc conception.
Without further extending our list of names, we may sum 
up our findings in the conclusion that the personallstic 
theory of the self stresses selfhood as a primary fact — 
whether implication or immediate experience — In consciousness, 
in knowledge; that the self is one’ or identical, persisting 
throughout changes in experience; that it is active, not 
passive, free and not a slave; tha^t each self is individually 
distinct from other selves; and that whatever else may exist, 
the self (as Descartes found) is one indisputable reality -r- 
the thinking, experiencing self.
b. Arguments for the existence of a self. From one 
angle it would seem unnecessaxy to prove the existence of 
that which one takes for granted when he offers a definition
38. Vide supra, p,37
39. Of Mnsterberg, "The Eternal Values", p.l6 etc.
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of it. Having defined or described‘''the self, thy argue for 
its existence? Or, having shown that it exists, why 
trouble one-^a mind with mitiute’ definitions, since in the 
very act of proof one must needs define?
There is probably no logical reason, that is, no reason 
inhering in the structure of thought, why both proof of 
existence and definition are required. But there are reasons - 
in the'history of thought. Since, the time of Hame, particularly, 
a certain type 'of specuaitlon has selz'ed the keen Scotohman*s 
Intelileotual weapons 4nd attempted to hold the banished self 
of philosophy forelrer in exile from the realm of reality.
If, therefore, any amn would-use the self In his system, he 
must establish its legitimate claim to citizenship in said 
realm of reality. On the other hand, a more 'catitious type 
of specup^tiOn,admitting the actual existence of the self-,
i
proceeds to explain it in terms of something eonsidered fnore 
fundamental or to analyze it — literally, dismember it — 
beyond the ability of 'the ordinary man to recognize it.
-Historical developments, then, make'it expedient-both to 
describe and' to offer proof of existence. And in practice, 
the two are but parts or sides of one'process. "
•Hence, we flnd'that philosophers of a personalistlo
turn, since the self is considered fundamental, combine the
r
two parts of the totad process. Miss Cs-lkins carefully 
refutes Hume^s arguments against tha existence of a self, 
aftd includes a pointed reference to this phase of her work
Theory of^ the Self
in her own description of selfhood. It is true that she 
claims it impossihle to prove the existence of the self, 
since (a)"proof means "bolstering np an assertion by a more 
fundamental one", and (b)in her system the self is fundamental 
to ideas.' Vihenoe one must conclude that the spiritualist 
must assert, without proper demonstration.But curiously 
enough — curiously, in the light of such a claim, or admission - 
she adduces what for all practical purposes amounts to proof, 
in her ddmonstration that Hume*s own philosophy is based upon 
the, implication of existing selves; both his theory of 
knowledge and his theory of morals imply selves.
Ladd ooncelves knowledge as the "self-realization" of 
a knowing subject. And since this is the essential nature 
of knov^ledge, the very fact of ^owledge (which is itself 
indubitable) contains a clear implication of the existence 
of a subject or self.'^'^ For him, there can be no dispute 
on this score. Debate cannot arise until somebody asks how 
we are to understand the real5.ty of mind. Ko lengthy 
argument is called for on the subject of the existence of 
self — the one short proof just noted is sufficient.
Bowne is nei.ther so timid as Miss Calkins nor so curt 
as Ladd. In the "Theory of Thought and Knowledge" he goes
40. Oaaiiina, "Persistent Problems of Philosophy", p.179-190
406 seqq.
41, Ibid, p.407. 42. Loc, olt.
43. ibid. esp. p.l88 seq.
44. Loo. cit.
41
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to oonslderahle length to show that epistemology must assume 
the existence of a self, and he mahes no apology for the 
manner of proof. He calls attention to the fact that a 
single judgment, like A is B, is possible only as there is 
a subject M, "which is neither A nor B, but embraces both in«r
the unity of its own consciousness".'^^ And no external 
nearness of individual states*' of eonscioueness can achieve 
the unity which the very coi^pt of judgment demands. He
•f< 1
further points out that the acts of judgment is not to be 
explained or conceived in ’terms of its own form, nor in terms 
of Its parts; nor can it be spatially pictured.^® A 
plurality of coexistent states of eonsciousness or of 
successive states, could not be a plurality except to an 
identical something which unites them in a plurality.
And if there were not an identical, persisting something 
for which states of oonsclousnesa axe units in ,a group or 
in a series, there could be no knowledge, since no single 
unit could by the hypothesis know any other, nor even itself.^8 
Moreover, resort to such expressions as unlty-of-cpnaclousness 
(opposed to unity of self), and splf-diptinguiphing, nelf^ 
identifying thought-, la at bottom only an atterr^t at- camouflage; 
the, self is still Itself under all its wefrd disguise
45. Bowne, "Theory of' Thought and Knowledge", p.30-37
46. fbid, esp. p.Sl
47,. Ibid, p.33 seq.
48. Ibid, p.33
49. Ibid. p^4-37
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Chapter I> Part IIP, of the "Metaphysips.” is .chiefly 
concerned with gaining- an accurate conception of the nature 
of the self. But even here, Bowne finds it convenient to 
reiterate some of the conclusions gained in the earlier 
worlc T- and, without apology.
These three thinkers illustrate the main personalistic 
lines of proof, the refutation of theories which deny'the 
self by showing that the theorists are compelled to imply a 
self or selves somewhere in the total system constructed, 
the assertion that the very .mode and manner of the knowledge 
process involves the existence ,of a unitary and abiding a??ent 
for .whom knowledge is knowledge, and the perception of an 
admitted self under the camouflage of co,mpounded and complicated 
descriptive expressions.
Having considered definitions praofs of existence, of a 
self by personalistic writers,aet us now turn for a moment 
to note differences between personalism and t^o other types 
of philosophy.
c. Differentiation from other theormes. Personalism 
is recognized as a descendant of both Bngllsh empiricism and 
German idealism. But is has certain unit 'characters which 
differ quite radically from other descendants of the two 
spiritual forebears. From empiricism came the sensationalism 
of Hume, and from sensationalism has come the new realism.
50. Bowne, ^Metaphysics”, p.399-301, 316-31S, etc.
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On the other side, German idealfiifem begat Hegelianism, and 
Hegelianism begat Bradleism, and Bradleism begat 
BoBanquetianism, which continueth even unto this day. 
Notwithstanding the common strains in ancestry, personalism, 
in its theory of the self, is ‘to be clearly distinguished 
from its popular second cousins, absolute idealism and the 
new realism,
(1) Whereas personalism proper accepts the individual 
human self as furnishing a key to the understanding of the 
ultimate nature of reality or the universe, absolute idealism 
(to follow Rogers'* summary) sees in the finite self "merely 
the- expression of one of the partial points of view which 
the richness of the absolute reality requires?.Finite 
persons become attenuated "connections "of content", whose
52existence is reduced to the "status-of being an appearance". 
Proceeding on the principle, "the more universal the more real 
absolutism finds in family, State, or religion a truer 
individual than in any finite self, 'the latter being nothing 
more than a phase, a fractional part, of the experience of 
the former. And the truest individual is nothing short of 
the most universal, i.e. the Absolute', In sharp contrast 
to personalism, which allows a unique and inalienable 
significance to the finite incClbidual, and which at-trlbutes 
an integral separateness to every person (whether human or
51, Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p.274
53. Ibid, p.375 quoting Bosanquet, "Philosophical
Theory of the State", p.181; "logic" vol. li 
p.258
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divine), absolutism, gazing from celestial heights upon 
the human self, sees him only as a blur, a mere speck. In 
the grand totality of the world-panorama. In short,under 
absolute idealism the self Is less a help toward, philosophical 
explanation than an incidental item to be included in 
complete systematic theory.
(2) In order to bring out to better advantage the contrast 
between the personallstlc theory of the self and the conception 
of the new realism, it may be well to take time to summarize 
some of the Ideas of one of the leaders in the latter school.
A full and well developed statement is found in Professor 
Parry*s chapter on "A Realistic Theory of Mind", which begins 
the exposition of Realism in "Present Philosophical Tendencies".53
Section 5 of this chapter starts with a declaration 
which has turned out to he a characteristic motif.in the 
neo-realistio symphony, to the effect that the common hond 
of things mental will never be discovered hy the method of 
introspection, but only by making observations on mind "as 
it operates in the open field of nature and history".54 
Already certain theories which define consciousness as 
relations between objects, external relations, ^d so on, 
have been criticised and found wanting. Now the ecales of 
criticism proceed to weigh theories that regard the action 
of the mind — or the mind itself — as nintrospeotively
53. Perry, ^Present Philosophical Tendencies", Ch. xii
54. Ibid, p.379
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aooeeslhl^ in a peotillarBerkeley an^ .l^ns-^erherg 
are cited "by liame. The fault in* this type of theory 5.0 
said to he the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity,56
Further criticism along the„same line occupies the 
center of attention for half of part III of the chapter,5?
A painstaking attempt is made to. show that the minji is not 
literally inaccessihle. ’To the innocent hy.stander it appes-ra 
that professor Perry ia hera largely--engaged in a favorite 
pastime of philosophers, namely, what Bowne would call the 
exegesis of a metaphor. He ’has 'sold hl.mself a bondservant 
'to Spatial imagery, and does not seem-j't.o realize’ that thinking 
la possible in any other terms.^ Fdr-he treats Individual 
"inaccessibility" as inplying impoaeihility;‘of ^spati^l?) 
ooht'acts, hence impoaslbrility of communioAtiOA) -e^xcept as 
the supposedly "inaccessible,!?' mind decides ‘to reach out toward 
another' mind, whi'c'h at the ‘same time must, reacli out toward the 
first, and establishes (spatiaX?<)-Op’iitsCct.
Now, it is 'hardly probable that 'Berkeley, even in the 
days preceding the dawn of .mcdern psycholo-gy, would contend 
for the smrt of a thing Terry denominates labsolute1 vacy 
of mindf. (Underscores mine). In fact, the good bishop of 
Cloyne took special pains to guard against that absolute 
privacy which is in the long run equivalent to solipsism,
05. Perry, "Present philosophical Tendencies", p.SSO
56, Ibid. p,381-3S3
57, Ibid. eap. p,386-398
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aa is evident on nrare than one occasion.58 And certainly 
such an extreme la hot In the thinking of Mnsterberg and 
Raahdall, and others of their general viewpoint whom Perry 
may have in mind. On the contrary, all would admit that 
the thoughts of many hearts are revealed at times when there 
is no conscious effort, no pronounced wlll-to-allow-revelatlon.
The- "inaccesslhillty” for which they argue, or which they 
assume, is only relative — in the dictionary sense; that is, 
they hold that I have some degree of control over my ideas, so 
that unless I am willing, my neighbor can not know all my ideas 
hcourately.^^ And unless I make an effort to give such 
expression to my ideas that my neighbor can accurately grasp 
them, his idea of my idea will'be at best, only rough and 
imperfect. In other words, the common idealistic — and 
personaliatic — conception of "inaccessibility of the mind"
** .A
is ptactioally equliralent to that of the neo-reallst when he 
explains tha'6 "my idea cannot be cori:5)letely Identical with 
your idea" beoause your idea will "diffe'r through the aooesqion 
of the last cognitive relationship".50 strangely, after all 
his effort to combat "inaccessibility". Perry does admit the 
individual'e ability to make his mind "Inaccessible", in the 
sense in which it is meant by the average Idealist.®^ Nor
58. Cf Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", sect.145;
"Alclphron", sect,4-7; "Theory of Vision Vindicated" 
sect.38-40; etc. etc,
59. Cf Wilra (ed) "Studies in Philosophy and Theology", p.32
60. Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p.387
61. Ibid, p.391 seq.
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does his discussion of relative difficulty of observation
in section 8 add serious support to his hypothesis, when
one chances to remesiber that the process of removing difficulties
in the way of observation of minds is made either more or
less easy than the process of removing difficulties in the
way of observation of things, according to the velle or
nolle of the mind under observation.6S
The trend of his argument amounts to this; since
attempts of introspection to '*find" the mind or self exhibit
so many unsatisfactory phases, and since the self is not in 
• \
reality "inaccessible or private, the best method of ascertaining 
the nature of the' mind la by "general observation".63
Now, to our innocent bystander it is not clear, even after 
some searching, just how "general observation" as a method of 
inquiry differs significantly from ordinary respectably trained 
introspection. Only a literal metaphor-exegete would close 
his eyes, bow his head upon his arras at his study table, and 
spend his hours and days and years in self-examination as a 
means of determining the nature of mind. The ordinary and 
respectably tralnd variety of introspection frankly observes 
the evidences of mind in others than its own organism, but 
does not deceive Itself into believing that it can interpret 
the observed conduct In other than that which it has found to
63. Of Hocking, -"Meaning of God in Human Experience", Oh, xvii; Mdnsterberg, "The Eternal values", 
p.l46 seq.
63. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies", p.286 etc.
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be its'own laws and habits and tendencies. Training has 
bidden it beware of the pitfalls of subjectivism, and of 
provincialism. It knows how to make some sort- of allowance 
for the personal? equation. But it seldom grows so self- 
conceited that it forgets the probability of lingering factors 
from the personal equation in the net result. 'Whereas, 
"general observation", judging from its behavior (or coftduct) 
in Professor Perry*8 chapter, goes about its work in inuch the 
•same way, actually, as respectable introspection; that is, 
it observes other minds, and strives for caution regarding 
the personal equation ift its net^ int'Orprstations. Yet all 
the while it' is n“alvely unconscious''-that Its interpretation 
is in ternra of what it has found within Itself. Attention 
is so highly concentrated' on what is observed, that the 
observer forgets that it ^ who is doing the observing — 
a common experience among men. This element of self- 
forgetfulness is the chief mark of diat'inotlon between 
"general observation" and introspection. In actual rife.
Which accounts for the form of the definition of mind arrived 
at by "general observation".
"Ijelther behavior, nOr even conduct," the definition 
runs, "is mind; but only because mind is behavior, or conduct, 
together with' the objects which these employ and isolate".
Or, in other putting, reaction plus stimulus equals mlnd.®^
64. Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p.303
65, Ibid, p.303 seq.
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And again, "a mind is a complex so organized as to act 
deeideratively or interestedly".®^
By reB&autely taking-the attitude of self-forgetfulness 
and maintaining the viewpoint of the passive voice and 
confining thought to terms of ppace images, the new realist 
is able to do without the uniqueness and individuality of 
the self, as personal idealists understand those characters.®'^
If it were in the province of this thesis to attempt a 
refutation of the neo-realiatio theory of the self, I should 
he tempted — hut my purpose is rather to expound clearly than 
to refute^ One good criticism ogcut=s In^ a note hy Miss 
Calkins on Spaulding*s hook, "The New Rationalism", in the 
Philosophical Review.®® A more detailed critical examination 
is offered hy Professor Brightman in a volume to which allusion 
has already been made.^® (Parenthetically, Spaulding's 
rejoinder to Miss CQ-l^^ihs centers around an argument to the 
effect that .relations need not imply a relater; that "some 
relations . . , just are";'^® and so on. As support to the 
conclusion that some relatione "just are", about the only 
the innocent bystander can find Is "just because". In short,
66. Perry, op, oit.
67. Of the remarks of Brightman in Wllm (ed) "Studies
in Philosophy and Theology", p,40 etc.
68. Calkins, "The New Rationalism and Objective Idealism",
art. in Philosophical Review, vol. xxviii (1919) 
p.598-605
669. Wilm (ed), "Studies in Philosophy and Theology", Ch. ill
70. Spaulding, same titie^as note 68 above, in Philosophical 
Review, vol. xxviii (1919) p.605-613
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V,
we have the strange speotahle of a Inan replying to a woman *s 
crltioiera with the traditional "woman's reason". ^ich is
%
no reason at all, for serious thought.) The hotter criticism, 
hy Professor Brightman, points -out ‘that the conception of 
relations as external, and the theory of consciousness as a 
relation, prove inadeo_uate to account for all the facte of 
experience. Spaulding's concession that consciousness itsSif 
cannot be merely a relation approaches near to "the truth that 
all terms and relations are relative to the purposes of some 
mind".'?’! ...... But let ue return to the main road.
dne more Important difference (for this thesis) between 
personalism, and the new realism remains to be mentioned.
Among peraonalists there Is a fair degree of agreement that 
time, space, purpose, caushlity, and so on are categories, 
i.e. constitutive forms according to which the self orgaAizee 
that which is given to it in experience, into knowledge.
Such disagreements as do occur within the camp concern the 
number and names of the categories, but not the opinion that 
there are categories, and that they are immanent in the mind, 
and that personality furnishes their raison d'etre, so to 
speak.
To the neo-realist number, space, time, and so forth 
are "wholes", real existences, consisting of elements which 
may be discovered by analysis (though he refuses to tell what
71. Of Wilm (ed) "Studies in 'Philosophy and Theology"
p,50 seq. and footnote #49.
72. E.g. Bowne*? "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", p.59-S5
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analysis is, since, in the language of the' street, "y* hnow 
whadda mean"-);’^^ these'elements and’thelr respective wholes 
standing In a whole-part relationship (though relation, alas, 
is "an indefinable" both the wholes and the parts are
reals in a universe composed of many other species of reals, 
and the thinker is .tacitly invited to assimilate them in the 
tdtallty Of his thinking as belonging to the class of thC 
pjust-are
With this brief examination into the theory of the self, 
we shall pause for a little while to consider an auxiliary 
question, before continuing with a study of the implications 
of the personalistic position.
73. Spauldingessay in Holt et dl. "The New Realism", 




VALUE-JUDGMEITT AHD THE VALUE CONCEPT-
F. G. S.- Schiller has- justly remarked that most American 
philosophical witlng on tR'd' suh'jeot of value hears.unmistakable 
marks of haste and immaturity.jt therefore seems advisable 
to turn aside af this juncture, and consider some preliminary 
questions before plunging intb' the- midst of a presentation of
a personalistic theory of valhe.
I choose three questions as preliminary.
(a) l!hat aspects of experience or reality axe included in 
the meaning of the term "value", as ordinarily accepted?
(b) Are such as^jects justly included?
(o) Under what circumstances does the value-judgment occur?
Discussion of these questions will be as brief as is con­
sistent with clearness.
e. Applets of experience or reality lncluded,:in the meaning 
ef the term "value", as orfllnarilv understood. 'Sohiller offers 
a tentative enumeration of seven sorts of value, namely, 
economic, ethical, aesthetic, pleasure-pain, religious, 
biological or .survival, and logical or oognitivs.’^^ 
fourth and sixth have particulhr reference to the flesh; the 
second, third, fifth and seventh to the spirit; and the first,
75. Schiller, art. and Ethics"
"Value" in Encyclopedia of Religion 
(Eastings, ed) vol. xli p.584
76. Ibid, p.585
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to one or the other or bothVae’the case may be. The terms 
themselves indicate which phases of experlenbe or reality 
enter into the valuation. Whatever item In experience or 
reality the orgafiism exerts energy to secure, or retain, or 
avoid', or get rid of, — that item "has value", or, the 
organism "values" It.
To be a little more exact, whatever item is deemed 
worthy of effort to secure, retain, avoid, get rid of, is 
"valued", in the broadest sense "of the word. (This explanation 
would be regarded as the more accurate, except to an extreme 
behavibrist).
And the Valuation "may be positive or negative in its 
nature, 77 but its-essential character -retnains as just described.
b. Criticism or .justification of the inclusion of such 
aspects. Toward the close of his article, above referred to, 
Schiller formulates, inductively, a suggested general definition 
of value, as "a personal attitude of welcome or the reverse, 
towards an object of interest".^® He might have modified hie 
statement, in order to avoid the appBaranoe of an Ideallstlo 
metaphysical bias, to read, "an attitude of welcome or the 
reverse, towards an item of perception or a phase of experience". 
But we shall not quarrel with him — the underlying principle 
is the Important point.
77. Cf Everett, "Moral Values"
78. Schiller', art. in'Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
(Hasting, ed) "Value" vol. xli p.589
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Now there is undoubtedly this common element of welcome 
or the reverse toward food (when one is hungry or contemplates 
the future probability of hunger), and toward an act which 
accords with loyalty to the social group, and toward certain 
color combinations, and toward a conclusion which promisee 
harmony with the sum total of conclusions already reached by 
the individual and considered by him to be important, or toward 
any other typical economic, ethical, aesthetic, and logical 
feature of experience. Greater or less differences may exist 
In the fields designated by the words "ethical", "economic", 
and the rest. But in all the varieties of experience in the 
different fields, there is enough similarity of the welcome- 
attitude to give language one word to express "welcome" toward 
food when one is hungry, or toward an act of lo^mlty to the 
social group, or toward a certain color combination, or toward 
the truth. Each is, In Its own way, "good".
Historically, dispute as to the nature of goodness, as to 
what things are good, and so forth, has loomed large in the 
progress of thought. Trom the time of Socrates and even before, 
the problem of the GOOD has been recognized as truly as problem. 
Speculation has made repeated attempts to settle the niitual 
relations of economic and ethical values, aesthetic -and 
religious values, and values in other combinations of fields. 
Philosophers have wrestled with the question of the relation 
of the Good to the totality of the universe. Somethimes 
there has been doubt whether It Is proper to include some of
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the fields listed hy ScJhlller lii. the concept of goodhese- 
'hadness. ^
But hardly an^r notewor’thy, system has had "the hardihood 
to deny' the fact of a' welc6me-a>ttitud!e, and the revetse, on 
the'part] bf the organism toward ohjecte or perception or 
items of experience. And on the whole, the typi'cai attitude 
in all the fields has' been admitted. '-The phllbsophical 
'problem Alas -been cons'idei^ed to oonceTn the fitting of- the 
attitude in the various fields into a bonsistent ’system.
In spite of Schiller*s hesitancy in-proposing a definition, 
he ’is correct In his‘ suggestlo'n* that the common element in 
the value-^judgments in all flbld’e is the -attitude ’of welcome 
or the reverse. ■ '
Some angl-ee of ‘ the preceding paragraphs naturally raise 
the third of the preliminary questions outllnedat the head 
of the chapter. 7?hat then are the —
o. Circumstances under which value-judgment occurs.
It was the opinion of Lotze that each sensation has Its value 
phase, or an accompanying value-judgment. "Even the simplest 
and apparently driest notions are never quite destitute of 
this attendant Ipl'eaeure-paii^ feeling".Windelband, as 
Schiller points out, emphasizes iJhat evaluations or judgments 
about -judlment "are invbived -in evefy judgment -ih that it
79. Lotze, "Mlcrocosmus", vol.. i p.343
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affirms-or denies, approves or disapproves".®^ Schiller 
himself avers that "values are not slnply fortuitous and 
gratuitious additions to facts, which are merely subjective 
and should be eliminated by strict science,' but are essential 
to cognitive process".®^ (Underscores mine). Mflneterberg 
argues that even though, for purposes of study, we think the 
mass of physical and psychological^-contents apaxt from-value, 
this very thought itself has the character of an evaluation. 
"The objects of the scientific judgments are without value, 
but the scientific judgments themselves axe affirmations of 
value".In a Blmllar'mood Prlngle-Pattlson observes that 
"the word cognition misleads us by its"exclusive reference to 
to the object as abbethlng external; we forget that cognition 
is an experience of the soul, and as stich’ neceesarily' has its 
feeling-value(Underscores mine). To th*e eye of Sorley, 
'Hhe primary experience Is at once perceptive and appreciative; 
its ob'jeot is both an existence ahd a value", which are 
discriminated for the sake of convenience, but remain one in 
reality.®^ Hooking leaves a clecir In^resSlon that he
80. Schiller, art. "Value", op, cit. p,585
81. Ibid, p.587
82. Mnsterberg, "The -Eternal Values", p.S3
83. Pringle-'^attlaon, "Idea of God", p.ll3 etc.
84. Sorley, "Moral Values and the Idea of God", p.36
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entertains a very similar belief.®^ One guiding star which 
determines the direction of Coe^s ’'Psychology of Religion" 
is the observation that "in the functions best known to us 
persons are adjusting themselves to the Ideals or standards 
of personal-social life that they set before themselves, and 
to. this end they are using — not .e.<3.justing themselves to — 
whatever they regard as eubpersonalWhich allows, even 
if it does npt openly imply, that every state of human 
consoiousnese has its value aspect. Rogers, commenting on 
Huxley's .ethical theory, contends;^ " . ... it is open to 
question to what extent the results are obtained^through the 
method^s of experimental science and a scrutiny of the processes
of nature, in separation, from our tendency to accept on trust
•
the human instincts that nature has implanted in us, and the 
attending sense of values(Undersoor.es mine). The plain 
trend of an article T?y Leon on the subject of "Literary 
Truth and Realism", is toward establishing, the uniyersa-llty 
of the value-judgment in human experience.®®
But why multiply testimony? Enough has been said to 
show that, in the putting of SoSrley, the primary experience —
85. Hocking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience", passim
86. Coe, "The Psychology of Religion", p.30; of "secondly"
p. 33
87. Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p-.l84
88 Leon art. "Literary Truth and Realism", in Mind 
#li9 (July, 1931) p,387-303
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every experience — has its value element or value aspect.
Value-judgment enters in some measure into every state, of 
consciouanees.
At first reading, the earnest protest of Professor 
Montague and Miss Parkhooxet, "things are vrhat they are, 
regardless of their power to edify",the refrain upon 
.the tongues of the neo-realists, might seem to involve denial 
of the conclusion we have reached. When one remembers, 
however, that the neo-reallstic reaction is against, subjectivism 
and against what it considers, undue deference to socially 
inherited products of the value-judgment in limited and 
particular fields — e.g. ethics and religion ~ the character­
istic protest appears in another light. The neo-realist 
desires to avoid false guides which would iBhd him dway from 
the straight and narrow path that leadeth unto truth. In 
his thought, subjectivism and its mate above described are 
false guides, deceiving the truth-seeker In the matter 'of 
values. But his protest does not carry any necessary denial 
of the conclusion of this section of our argument, i.e. 'denial 
of the universality of the value—judgment In experience.
89, Montague and Parkhurst, a^t. "Ethical and Aesthetic 





MTURE OF THE VALUE-JUDGMENT; VALUE AND THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Having considered the personallstlc theory^of the self, 
and some preliminary' questions concerning value-judgment and 
the value 'concept, we turn attention to reflections' upon 
value-theory as it is related to epistemology.
Approach to my own 'theory will be made via brief glances 
at the teachings Or Implications of selected systems and 
thinkers.
a. Presentation and evaluation of the theories of selected 
schools of thought. The first type of philosophy to be 
noticed Is pragmatism; the second, neo-realism, and along 
with it Dewey; the third; absolute Idealiem;^. and the fourth, 
other Idealisms, of six thinkers who are more or leas thorough­
going personallsts.
fi) To the popular mind, the first associated idpa upon 
presentation of the word "pragmatism" will be, nine, times in 
ten, the that-which-works-equale-truth doctrine.. Not so 
clearly apprehended, on the average, is the back-lying 
conception of the nature of knowledge. But in our purpose 
it is this very back-lying conception which is significant.
Pragmatism makes of knowledge a vehicle upon which I
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travel from Item to item of experience, loading on those items 
which/Will fit into the load I have already picked up, occasion­
ally dumping off part of my load In order to mELke a place in 
which to fit an insistent new item, the vehicle not only 
serving to transport me from item to Item, hut also doing the 
work of picking up and dumping off. Or it is a blind man's 
guide, trying to help liie put my finger upon the object I sbek — 
the ob|:ect of perception. Or it is a fisherman's trident- 
upon which I try„to Impale the fishes of reality swimming in 
thg waterfall, of expedience.As Rogers sums it up,
"Knowledge is thtis .an affair wholly of transitions and leadings 
within .experience
Upon this basis, the fundamental species of the value- 
judgment is the cognitive; it is primary, and others are 
(relatively speaking) secondary.- Making them secondary 
casts no reflections upon their validity or Importance; It 
only stresses the logical .priority of the cognitive, the‘‘fact 
that it 3^ fundamental to the rest.
Implicit in the pragmatic epistemology is the principle 
that cognitive value-judgment is knowledge in l^ts character 
of guide, as suggested above. Indeed,, the who,le knowledge 
function, strictly interpTeted as it appears- in-actual I'lfe,
90. Of James, "Pragmatism", p.58, 75-81 and lect. vl;^
also the fair-minded account in-Rogers*, "Englfsh 
and American Philosophy", p.359-388; Perry, 
"Present Philosophical T.endencias", eap. ix
91. Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p.377
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amounts to neither more nor lees than cognitive value- 
judgnient, the efforts of which men describe by the'adieotives 
"true” and "false" in proportion as they st.ee^r life*'s frail 
b'arque into smooth or rough seas. Value, now, -should be 
‘Uhders'tood as a term which indicates in what way knowledge 
is a -function of experience*.
Emphasis is- la„id upon the tentative nature of all the 
"atta;inments" of knowledge. Conclusions are perpetually 
subject to revision. The transcendental: idealists, or any 
other dogmatists, 'wha'suppose that any of our present 
conclusiond of knowledge are ^eternal "truthssuCfs^ 
hallucination; or if they pursue their search in the hope 
-of finding, an occasional "eternal truth", they commit 
folly of'him who sets out to capture, the .pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow. For knowledge'-le an everlasting case 
of the trial-and-succees me.thod, of jxedagoglcal fame. And 
truth is forever a- class name, not for the ideal and- goal 
dr knowledge, but-connoting tha relative*-and tentative status 
’Of ooncluslons.
Hence^nrooeeding into other value fields, ^those* products 
of the knowledge 'funotion. — those conclusionsj, if vou please 
which bear the title of ethical truth, aesthetic canon, 
religious -^jrinoiple, and all their kindred, have attained 
the degree of prestige they enjoy because they ones satisfied 
a demand. But the mere fact that they have done so is no
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proof tliat they will always do bo. Whether they ‘do or hot 
all depends upon the ^nature of future demandB,. The part of 
wisdofii is 'to accept them on trial, and test them to see if 
they turn' out to he henefioi’al, satisfactory, upbuilding to 
our personal lives.For, ’’the eesehoe of good is simply 
to satisfy demand", and "the true is the name of whatever 
proves itself to he good in the way of belief
Persdhalism can agree with pragmatism regarding the ' 
tentative nature of particular human conclusions, and regarding 
the principle that oohsistency is the test of the truth of 
ideas, even VSough’'pragmatism stresses the'praoti'cal 'and 
psyohologichl phase' o'f consistency rather than' the logical.
But the two philosophical viewpoints mahe a ^slightly different 
distinction between knowledge-and experience. Whereas 
pragmatism makes knowledge a "function of experienoe"", 
persojaallsm thinks of knowledge as an arderly arrangement 
of experience made by the sftif after the pattern of principles 
Immanent within itself. "The thought activity involved in
qe iknowing is beyortd all question", ®
How this affects’’the peraonalist *8 idea of the value- 
judgment will appear later in the present chapter.
93. James, "Will to Believe", ^.essays 1, li, vl; and- 
"Pragmatism", esp^'leo'S, vi-viii
93. James, "Will to 'Believe", p.SOl
94. James, "Pragmatism, p.76
95. Of Bowne, "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", Ch. lii ■
et passinf
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(3) Even more difficult .than the presentation of the 
pragmatist’s theory of knowledge so as to do justice to 
differences among the individual thinkers, is the task of 
presenting the neo-realistlc epistemology. For within- 
the ranks of neo-realism, as In. many another major philosophical 
mo.vement, there appear several striking divergences of 
opinion,
In generaj., it may be said that the realistic theory of 
the nature of knowledge is a corollary oX the initial 
metaphysical assumption^ that things are^.what they are 
Independently of being kno-wn^ and^tjiat the act or process 
called knowledge leaves things, unchanged in theiP- essential 
character. Ideas, mental st^tesj do not represent things 
and facts; they literally present them.
And thing or fact is no whit modified, by "entering into the 
knowledge relation".Furthermore,..relations are as truly 
real as the,things they relate. .They are subject to 
discovery in,the same way as things. For convenience* sake, 
things may be said to egist, while rel'atlons subsist. But 
the status of' subsistence detracts not one lota from the 
fulness of their reality,^®
.p
96. A detailed account of differences between Per^y and
his oo-platformist‘Spaulding is given by Professor 
Brlghtman In Wilm (ed*) "Studies in Phllospphu and 
TheologyCh.. i'ii; differences among others are 
■ noted in Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", 
Oh. vlil
97. E.g, Perry, "Present' Philosophical Tendencies", p.3l5;
of his chapter in Holt et al. "The New Realism" 
p.99-151
98. E.g. Russell, "The problems of Philosophy", p,156 etc.
Perry, ibid. Oh. xiil etc.
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Knowledge, then, becomes the event which occurs when a thing 
or relation enters into a sjieoific form of relation with the 
(biological?) orgahlsm.’99 m a sense, it is Itself a type 
of relation. Ever and always, nothing is <*!Greated", nothing 
is genuinely and fundamentally "modified", by the event 
knowledge.
Among the relatione which subsist are logical laws, 
aestiiatlo and e'thloal values. Truth, heauty, goodness do 
not depend upon a Person or persons, any more than they 
ddpend upon stones or water or air or anything else of the 
sort. Truth, heauty, goodness are ultlmates.
A value-judgment, therefore, is a knowledge-event.
When a stone having certain qualltlfessenters Into relatidn 
with the ooneept heauty, the judgment la said to occur:
"This stone is beautiful". Or when an orgaAlsm behaves In 
a certain way, knowledge may relate the act to the concept 
goodness, the relating process taking the form of "that-act- 
Is-good". And similarly in the case of truth.
From my (personallstlc) viewpoint, the most significant 
feature of the neo-realistlc doctrine of the value-judgment 
Is its care to debar the self from active Interference in 
the ongoings of the world, to deny Its power to create or 
add anything to exlstents and subslstents; and to Interpret
99. Gf Perry, op. oit. and p.33S seq.;
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events ir[ the language, of the passive vplge, jjesolutely and 
consistently. Of course, Parry does not etlclc to his 
prinolphe all the way through. As Professor Brlghtman 
puts It, "It would almost seem that (his) reason demarids 
naturalism, his heart religion and valueOn,, more 
strictly, there .oome times In the progress of his refXeotloh 
when he senses the Insufficiency of the passive, voice, the 
cardinal principle of the neo-realistio reaction against 
rationalism,- ahsoluto idealism, and voluntarism. But
aside from occasional and 'temporary da^ortions from the 
neo-reallstic ensign, realists proceed on the hypothesis 
that the self does not and can not actively interfere In the 
ongoing of the world-as-lt-fe^ - . 3 v v
(3) The focus of attention with absolute idealism, as 
with the neo-realistio reaction against it, is toward a
t
metaphysical theory. Idealism spends its first energy in 
elaborate attempts to explain the nature of the Absolute 
which furnishes a key to the final understanding of experience, 
in an effort to show that only by such an Absolute can the
r*
Intellect's demand for unity and system be met, and in an 
attempt to solve the p^oblejn of mutual relations among the. 
selves, both finite and Infinite. A student on a fellowship 
from the University of Mars, delving among the 4ocuments of 
absolutism, might well express a wish for more pages upon the
100. Wilm (ed) "Studies in Philosophy and Theology", p.30
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I
theory of knowledge as’ such, although in the very metaphyaioal
1
sections he would find some hints epistemological. u
The sum and substance of the hints is to the effect that |
the Infinite is the only real and oon^Jlete self', hut' that He 
"shares" His perceiving, thinking, willing, the "elemental 
experiences", with finite selves.The laws of consciousness,
1
of logic, become the laws of nature inasmuch as the Absoltite
is primarily oohsclousness. ,
In a judgment,' subject and predicate are joined by a
cement of identity, the cement consisting of a more or less .
dilute reality.. So. when the Absolute makes a judgment, the 1
* . ; • I
cement is one hundred percent pure. When a finite self I
j
makes a judgment, there is always some degree of dilution; j
but some cement la always present, i.e. no judgment is ever \
I
completely false. Every judgment, by its very nature, ;
therefore becomes a value-judgment. And the eternal goal 1
toward which (human) judgments strive is "an organized system j
requiring nothing beyond. Itself to render It intelligible^", I
J. ’
commonly called Truth.
As with pragmatism, the fundamental value-judgment is I101. Of Royce, "World and'the Individual", vol. i Ch.viil- \
ix esp. p.436; and summaries and criticisms of 
Calkins, "Persistent Problems <yf -Philosophy", 
p.417-455; Perry, "Present Philosophical 
Oh. vlii, and "Present Conflict of Ideals",
Ch. xvil; Rogers, "English and American Philosophy" 
p.350-397
103. Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p.369 |
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of the cognitive- so;rt.^'^^ Aesthetic and ethical judgments 
approximate more nearly to the final and aheolute Truth, the 
more the dilution of cognitive cement in them is reduced.
But none of them are to he rejected as totally in error.
Each is to he considered as ahartial, and is to he brought 
together with all the resti even when-they show themselves 
variant or contrary or apparently contradictory, into a grand 
union, an ultimate synthesis. For all judgments, whether 
logical or aesthetic or ethical, are at hottom merely fragments 
of the one total absolute Experlenoe.-v ”
(4) The six idealists selected are mnsterherg, Adams, 
Hocking, Pringle-Pattison, Sorley, and Leighton. They will
he considered in the order named.
(A) Part one of the Vernal Values" outlines the central 
features of Mansterherg*8 voluntarism. And explanations of
the nature of the value-judgment &re prominent elements therein.■»
In the very beginning it is understood that; "Every 
evaluation and every preference evidently presupposes a will 
which takes an attitude and which finds its satlsfactlon".^'^^ 
The second and third chapters are fairly saturated with 
exposition and argument in defense of this principle.As
V 'opposed to the self-forgetful theories of neo-realism,
103. -Vide supra, p.61
104. Mdnsterherg, "The Eternal Values", p.l3
105. E.g. (ibid.) p.48, 56, 64
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voluntari'sm sees In evaluation, an act of an agent, will.
But- voluntarism does no-t ‘cane to he confounded with 
subjectivism. In its effort to stay clear o£ had company 
It emphatically denies that pleasure or pain (of the. 
individual) have any influence upon the true value-judgment.106 
Fox the true value-judgment is an act .of over-personal will, 
or a "pure will".
Now ^ aot of will which is in its very nature unrelated 
to the pleasure-pain, experience, which lies behind and below 
"all 'else, "which secures for us a world", is the "assertion of 
identity a'mong-the changing experiences". And right hexB is 
the fundamental absolute valuation.Particular logical, 
aesthetic, inoral, and metaphysical evaluat^ions are essentially 
of the same nature as the original will-act of seeking 
identities.
At many points Mdnsterberg comes close to the position of 
absolutism. But in his treatment of finite selves he steers 
wide enough of the absolutist course to mark himself as not
(to
one of the clan. For him the experience of each person 
remains his own, in spite of its over-personal aspects. As 
I understand him, the elements in his theory which have the 
absolutist tone need to be taken as efforts to avoid, nay, to 
rise above, subjectivism, and consequent solipsism or ohaos. 
Stress upon value as eternal is a protest against their (values'
106. MCtneterberg, "The Eternal Values", p.64, 70 seq.
107. Ibid. p.75-77
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merely local orlgiii'and validity (suhjeotlviatlc), and 
against a doctrine of their relative and ephemeral (?) 
statue (pragmatistic). He huUde his value-house upon 
the rock of the overperaonal in"order that when rains 
descend, and floods, come, -and ^wliids blow, the house may 
not fall. To apeak of evaluations, "therefore, as will 
acting according to over-personal demand is equivalent to 
denying that they are absolutist fractions of’the Infinite 
Experience, and to asserting their character as more than 
local, more than relative in both quality and significance.
I am inclined to doubt the finality of the deduction of 
a fixed number, twenty-four, values from the original will-act. 
And my own theory of the nature of the value-judgment is not 
Identical in several particulars with his. Yet X do agree 
that human evaluation-acts exceed what subjectivism and 
pragmatism would allow them.
(B) Somewhat akin to Mnsterberg is Professor George 
P. Adama. He likewise reacts against the^ relativism of the 
pragmatist, and seeks a so Lid and permanent 'foundation in 
^objective" entities.Most interesting to me is his 
argument that ”ideaiEf • . . utter the life and interests of 
some organism"; and while this is true, we as philosophic 
inquirers "miss the purport and insistence of the problem 
of knowledge unless we recognize that it is an instance of
108. Adams, "Idealism and the libdern Age", passim.
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the problem of values at large", and furthermore that "to 
define knowledge and to' say something significant about 
the situation which makes it possible and rea:L, is to throw 
some light upon all of the other values, ethical,,religious, 
and social, . . For, although I do not follow
every step of the pathway he takes, I am in hearty accord with 
the belief implicated in his position, that the st\idy of the 
value-judgment is fruitful in proportion as the student 
recognizes the inseparability of knowledge and value.
‘ (0) Hooking defines value-judgment as "a way of knowing
objects with one’s whole-idea".It Is a mode of meeting 
new experience, by aid of previous experience- It is an 
adjustment of the new object to the "apperceptive mass", 
which includes instincts, organic capacities for enjoyment, 
experiences, fancies, memories, ideas.
Still, evaluation is not a cold and arduous exertion of
the purely logical faculty. Reason holds no patent upon
the process. Quite the contrary, it is so undellberate and
effortless, so natural (as fond mothers use the word), that
"an object of value is an object in ^Ich my whole-idea finds
112some peculiar ease and sufficiency of application".
109. Adams, "Idealism and the Ifodern Age", p.93
110. Hocking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience",
p.l39
111. Ibid. p.l34-I'2Q, 413-418, etc.
113. Ibid. P.1S9, Of p.129-138
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For my purpose, the significant facto,r in Hoclcing^s 
position is hie insistence -that value-judgment is no 
exclusive privilege of the self—conscious, reason^ it is more 
subtly pervasive than the clear-out propositions of a 
syllogism. Withal, the evaluations of which I have peroe^itive 
knowledge, concrete knowledge, are acts of finite selves who 
have finite endowments and history, and who are more than 
fragile fragments of the Ififinlte.
(Dj Pringle-Pattison re-echoes Mnsterherg's war-cry 
that the sense of value is something broader and higher than 
"selfish preference or Individual desireEvaluations 
therefore have more than a particular subjective significance. 
They have their spring and fountain in reality. Han "is to 
be taken as organic to the world, and his- experience, therefore, 
in all its reaches, as a process by which the true nature of 
reality communicates Itself to him".^-^^ Value-judgments, 
just as truly as sense-perceptions, put him in touch with
objective realities whose esistence may not be challenged.
*115
The act of value-judgment- is an act of apprehension.
Approaching the problem in a different manner, Pringle- 
Pattison more satisfactorily than his German-Araerican ally 
attacks the strongholds of subjectivism and relativism, and
113. Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God", p.4:l
114. Ibid. p,l'31
115. This sub-section is grounded in Pringle-Pattison
"Idea of God", esp. the entire first series of 
lectures.
Nature of the Value-judgment 73
lays "baTe their perennial weaknesses. Moral judgments in 
particular are hidden to stand ereot in their dignity and 
how the neck to no fo'eman. ,
(E) Underlying Sorley's "Moral Values and the Idea of 
God." we find a theory of the "objective" existence of values, 
and of human ability to "apprehend" them, strikingly close 
to that of Pringrespattlson. Values are’ a ‘distinct order 
of reality, co-ordinate with exlstents — persons and things — 
and relations.Evaluations have 'a validity needing no 
apology, since.they are surely instances of apprehension of 
reality as the perception of existents. Value can not be 
reduced to a state of the perbeiving subject, or to a dream 
by one that sleepeth; to state that' a lOVing act is good 
or that a fair act is just, is not to spin a sailbr'^s yarn, 
but to assert a fact.^^*^
Pringle-Pattisdn emphasizes 'that valu'e-judgment 'apprehends 
a reality, not a phantom. Sorley continues the emphasis, 
adding a more clearly elaborated theory ‘of the' nature of the 
act. .He (the latter) shows that value-judgment presupposes 
and implies judgment oT existence; that it further Implies 
the existence of persons for whom valubs are, and 1^ whom 
intrinsic values inhere and come to realization. It is in 
these additions that I find kinship to my own view.
116. Sorley, "Moral Values and the Idea of God", e.g.
p, 190 seq.
117. Ibid, passim
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Inoidentally, the differences in the statement of Sorley 
and the pragmatists rest baclc upon the fact that his primary 
interest concerns moral values, while their attention centers 
upon the cognitive. They search for a test of perceptions 
and reasoned conclusions; he* studies the nature and validity 
of morals,
(F) For Leighton values have no being apart from
"valuators”.^?-® They axe called into being in and through
the activities of selves, when the latter are ”in dynamic
interplay with nature".1^9 Their validity lies In the fact
that they are "mental counterparts of the ways in which nature
1^0
behaves In response to the demands of human personality".
In another connection: "value is always a quality of
spltitual selfhood or personality, regarded as essentially
120involving membership in a spiritual community".
Evaluation therefore is a certain form of the activity 
of the self, or it is the activity of the self viewed in a 
certain light. Value-judgments made by finite persons, he 
argues, sustain a relation to an objective order analogous 
to the relatifens between perceptions and scientific theories 
and another objective order.131 That is, evaluations are 
no more to be discounted as illusion than are conclusions.
118. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", p.43. Cf p.1191127,
175, 552
119. Loc. cit.
120. Ibid. p.309. Cf p.495-500 
131, Ibid. Ch. xxix esp. p.409
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based on sense data.
And yet Leighton remembers the frailties of flnitenees.
He takes better care than any of the idealists just mentioned 
to face problems arising out of the theory that we finite 
crea.tures come into direct contact with sense—things and 
super-sensible values. Frankly he recognizes that in this 
mortal life man must increase in wisdom (not to say stature), 
and the fact of a process of increase implies a degree of 
incompleteness, of reaching toward rather than final attainment, 
in judgments of any sort, whether they concern material things 
or immaterial ideals.^22 m the frankness and care with which 
he faces this particular branch of the problem he is a step in 
advance even of Sorley. And in my opinion h’s treatment of 
the whole value question is more comprehensive and better 
balanced than the discussions of any of the Idealists in the 
list.
Hence, I shall make rather free use of him in the 
succeeding section of this chapter.
b. The theory of value as a category. One of-the. 
characteristic elements in personalism Is the doctrine of 
the categories, borrowed from Kant. Personallstlo philosophy 
points out that experience is not irrational nor freakish 
not (absolutely) Incalculable. Consciousness is never totally, 
chaotic. Always it proceeds according to some sort of rule.
133.- Cf Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", Ch. xxvll-xxix, 
xxxvl
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It reveals in its ongoings at least a degree of orderliness.
The personalist also holds that thought is no passive
recrod-taklng process. It involves activity on the part of
the thinking self. Sometimes it Is descrihed as "a relating
activity", which "consists largely in estahlishing rational
relations among the raw materials of our experience",*^
Now the very concept of orderliness implies a scheme or
principle of order., And if the active self does the ordering,
it must do so according to certain principles or schemes.
The principle or principles in accordance with which it
Introduces order into consciousness take the name of categories
Categories are "norms "by which the mind proceeds"., and the
1 ?4"framework of thought". They are not "given" in .experience
as realists say, and abstracted from other items of experience 
by a philosophical effort. Neither can they be explained 
after the fashion of (Hume) empiricism, as products of the 
association of Ideas. Categroles are principles imminent in 
the mind. Their discovery comes by inference, and not by 
"experience". Or more accurately, the discovery of their 
categorical nature is a matter of reasoned inference rather
than of experlenoe.125
No hard and fast agreement as to the names, number, and
123. Bowne, "Theory of Thought and Ifnowledge", p,62
124. Of Ibid, p.59; Lotze, "Microcosmus", e.g. vol. i
p.243 seq.: Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos"* 
p.133-135,'239, etc.
125. Bowne, ^Theory df Thought and Knowledge", p.61-63;
Leighton, loc. cit. and esp. p.l34 seqq.
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olaesi'ficatlon of the oategorles has yet been reached-.
But among idealists, especially of the personallstio party 
there Is practically no doubt of the fact of categories.
As8un>ing the fact, I shall now endeavor to support the 
thesis that one oJf the oategorles is. that of VALUE,
For some time personalisms have been feeling their way 
along in this direction, although it Is not until igBS that 
I find a clew and explicit exposition bf the exact theory, 
Lotse laboriously argues that nerves give us a report 
of pleasantness' and unpleasantness, but never of rlgh 
wrong; that ethical Judgments are Indirectly lnfluenc-e& by 
the accuracy of sense-perception^. he Insists that
bodily organs and neural reactions contribute not one mite 
to the moral Judgment ltseif.126 judgments of duty and
obligation there is Inplioated not or^y "the power of 
experience to develop", but also a form or principle in 
accordance with which the development tabes place.Which 
is the next thing to saying that moral value is one of the
categories.
Bowne treads in the same path. His "Principles bf 
Ethics" is careful to distinguish between the contents of 
the concrete moral code and the moral fact that distinction 
is madd between a right and a wrong, with a sense of obligation
136. Lotze, «Microcosraa9", e.g. 'vol. 1 p.3S3 seq 
127. I'bld- vol.‘ i p.686 seq.
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to the right.But it does not seem to occur to him, 
in the formulation of hie epistemology,, to develop the germ 
herein .contained.
Criticising metaphysical systems which build a '^riclc 
wall between man and the universe^ and then sw^at bloody in 
an effort to connect them, Pringle-Batti^on contends that 
cognition and valuation alike put us in touch with reality.
And he holds that experience has beoth 1:he cognitive and 
valuatlonal phases.Capacities bred in the bone of
minds _ to use a,rather awkward materialistic figure of
speech — make .possible the, weaving .of..syet^em of knowjbedge. 
And the nature of these capacities.is such that values,as 
wall as what we ordinarily xmderstand by facts are Included 
in the system.Although he does not in so many words 
make value an epistemological category, prIngle-Pattison 
evidently has something nefir to the conception in the back­
ground of his thinking.
A leading motif in Sorley'e "Moral Values and the Idea 
of God" concerns proofs that ideals, values, have a causal 
efficiency in the ohaj.n of events.Ethical ideas are 
"literally constitutive of r.oality as maAlfested^.in tlme."^^^
1S8. Bowne, "Principles of Ethics", e.g. p.99 seq.
139. Pringle-Pattison,, "Idea of God", i5.113 seq.
130. .Ibid- esp, p. 114-130
131. Sorley, ."Moral Values and the Idea of God", Ch. ii,
vii, vlil, et passim
133, Ibid. p.l87
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They enter into -reality "as a factor In its constitution".
But Sorley does not dip deeply Into the epistemological
problem, at least, not deeply enough. Hie main purpose, to
establish the non-subjective and.,non-relative status Of moral
vaJues, and to work out their in^lloatlon. in a system of'
metaphysics, apparently .keeps him- from going into the technical
epistemological '4ueeti'on. To do so would be, for him, a
digression. It would spoil the unity of his plot.
But, like Prlngle-Pattison, he seems to carry in the
warp If not In the woof of his thinking an assumption that
the valuation phase of experience is ours because mind has
the value capacity; it orders parts of its material in
accordance with the value principlej4^^
Mdnsterberg has made his. theo^ry of eternal values so
much a Hegelian metaphysical logic that the all-around
philosopher’s search for an,.expli.oit fhuman) epistemology
proves practically vain. Like Sorley, his main objective
-*•
prevents him from wandering into the byways.
And so it come about that the world waited for Boifehton 
to give it an explicit theory of value as a category of 
knowledge, in the same rank with, time and spape and quality 
and the rest. That he understands the term "category" in 
the full personaliatic sense is evident from his opening
f
133. Sorley, op. cit. and p.l88 
134 Ibid. eap. 160-169
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paragraphs in chapter IX.And value is not only explicitly 
named in a tentative list of categories; it is givep a special 
treatment along with individuality and purpose.^36, it is one 
of nine "types” of the supreme category, order,It is one 
of the metaphysical forme of reality. And since the world of 
reality is rational, l.e. hnowahle, value is one of the 
principles pn which experience is organized into coherence 
and rationality.^^® • ^
My own conception Is almost identical y7lth that of 
Leighton. I see that we apprehend, as we say. That is, 
we organize certain experiences in knowledge as things, acts, 
events, which are — they belong to the fact order. The 
process of apprehending has been according to the category
of being.........At the same time, we organize the experiences
as things, acts, events, which ought to ^ or which ought not 
tp_ This side of the apprehending process has-been
according to another category, namely, that of VALUE.
Furthermore, I regeird valuation as fundamental, since
I can conceive of no concrete state of consciousness which
lacks the value element, any more than I can conceive of a
■?
state whlohlacks the being element, and probably the time 
element. For laboratory usee single features of consciousness
135.. Leighton, "Man and the cosmos", esp. p.l33.
136. Ibid. Ch. xvll
137. Ibid, p.167
138. Ibid. Ch. ix passim. Esp. p.134
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can be abstracted, segregated from other complicating 
features. But in life as it la, the complexity must be 
acknowledged. Thus, being and time and value may by fiat 
of the student be segregated from complicating features of 
experience. . ^t least two of the three, however, remain 
principles in the ordering of-evgry^concrete experience, 
and hence are entitled to the rank of categories.
Again, there is the co^^slderatlon that even ^,s two 
-.Individuals aregue ^regarding the quality-ultimate of an 
object of common experience yet cannot escape the quality- 
form; as they may disagree on a matter of space-outline 
or spaoe-meaeurement yet cannot escape the space-principle; 
as they may have differing opinions regarding time-measurement 
yet cannot avoid the time-framework in their thinking — so 
dlBcuBsiona may occur as to value-ultimates, the^so-called 
subjectivity and objectivity-, the relativity and eternity of 
values; but the value-form of consciousness remains forever 
a tacitly admitted Yea.
Once more: as every definition of number is circular, 
i.-e. we can not define it except by pointing to it, so every 
definition of value is circular — it has to be- defined in terms 
of itself. It is in the last analysis irreducible.
For these reasons, because It is fundamental In every 
concrete experience, because in spite of disputes over the 
ultlmates to which it refers the thought-form remains true i:o
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type, and hecauee it ie-not reducible to anything more, 
fundamental, VALUE IS A GATEGORX._
♦ *% ^ yThe remaiiider of the present chapter will glance very 
briefly at two or three objections which might be raised to
. . ■■ i "the general conclusion.
c. Some possible criticisms o^f the theory, and replies 
thereto. Criticisms of this theory' grounded in the neo- 
realistic initial bias, or in any natural kindred of realism, 
need not be met in detail here. The inquirer is referred to 
the whole personalistic foundation argument as 'found in a 
cloud of witnesses. Suffice it to say, the theory of value 
as a category depends upon an acceptance of a unitary and 
abiding self, active in the knowledge-act.
pragmatism might possibly find in value, as it finds in 
truth, a "function" of knowledge. it might consider ethical 
principles and aesthetic canons as functions, related to or 
subordinate to the knowledge ^cognitive) function, truth.
But the fact is, that the very concept of value — or truth, 
either — as. a function can be formulated in the mind only if 
the mind works according to the pattern or principle which I 
have defended as the category of value. From one angle, the 
scientifically bent might view value a:s a function. From 
another, the philosophically inclined sees it as something 
far more than a mere f\mctlon; It is a way of organising. 
Wherefore the personaliet does not accept the pragmatistlc view.
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Two ohjeotions might he raised hy one who supposes' that 
the adoption of the category do'btrine means swallowing Kant 
whole. For one, it might’^e suggested that the typical 
Kantian clings to a division of all objects l^to phenomena 
and noumena. Whereupon the-conclusion might, ba hastily, 
drawn that if this particular- division line could be erased, 
the category (as a means of organizing Knowledge to correspond 
with reality-in-itself) would go Into the scrap heap. But 
the truth is that the personalist's category, as I believe 
himself conceived it in the "Prolegomena", remains a necessity 
for the rational ordering of thought, whether the dlng-an-slch 
is retained or eliminated.
The second objection might read; But on what ground Is 
the value category necessary to any rational thought whatever? 
I reply: I do not contend that any particular category should 
he pronounced uniquely and solely necessary, but that some 
principle of order Is necessary, and that value happens to be 
one of the principles actually present to rational experience
as I observe it.
One more possible criticism might come from within the 
ranks of Idealism. Objection might be offered that the 
doctrine of the category Implies that forms are Imposed "upon 
things by the subject".1^9 This could be taken to mean that 
somehow subjects recast the objects of experience In moulds 
of their own fashioning, arbitrary and freakish; that every 
act of apprehension Is a literal Idiosyncrasy. But the
139. Of Sorley, "Moral Values and the Idea of God", p.l99
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doctrine of the category does not necessarily imply such a 
subjective freakishness.* It only eraphas'izes that orderliness 
implies principles of order, which principles may ho (and 
doubtless are) similar In all Wnds,*
Some of these points will become clearer in the succeeding 
discussion of the meaning of the concept "objectivity" as It.
V
relates to value. ^
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Chapter V
OBJECTIVITY OF VALUE: .VALUE AND METAPHYSICS
- i
From the days of Greek philosophy onward, onetbf the 
taxing questions, of speculation has concerned the metaphysical 
character of value or the values., Hor is the debate yet ended 
By way of preliminary orientation, in an approach to the 
study of contemporary tendencies, it should be noted that the 
modern differences of opinion revolve around two moot points. 
And not infrequently there is failure, in argument upon one 
or both, to grasp the exact nature of the issue-.
In this day of scientific willingness not to deny 
phenomena if they establish themselves as facte, but rather 
to try to explain them; and in a day when psychology'does 
so well itw work of classifying and 'deecrlbing the facts of 
mental life, there is not much attempt, in most quarters-, to 
Ignore or deny the fact of valuation as a psychological 
phenomenon. Differences arise when epistemological and 
metaphysical questions are brought forward. What is the 
nature of values? What ultimate significance have they? 
Around these two points the variations in opinion revolve.
And each school of thought has its characteristic answer to 
the questions, although individual representatives of the 
schools do not necessarily agrei in method of approach not 
in every detail of conclusion.
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Presentation and evaluation of theories of selected 
schools of thought. The schools selected for consideration 
are contemporary. Absolutism (idealistic), materialism, 
and pragmatism will passed over with not too lengthy 
discussion. New realism and various idealisms that are 
more or less thoroughly personallstic will be the centers 
of attention.
(1) We have already noted the absolutist emphasis upon 
the metaphysical, with its tacit subordination of the value 
aide of speculation. Not of course, that the absolutist 
forgets the value side or falls to take account of it in the 
construction of his metaphysics, as witnessed in the distinct 
aesthetic interest of Bdeanquet ^hd the religious philosophy 
of Royce.. But, in the last analysis, absolutism assumbs that 
the intellect and its characteris-tic demands must first be 
satisfie'd. Afterward, aesthetic^’dnd ethics may adjust 
themselves to the fundamentals selected for them.
It is interesting to see, then, the variety of ways in 
which values a,re handled.
.Royce, clear in his own mind that finite experiences are 
phases of the experience of the 'Infinite, clear that all 
existences are parts, so to speak, of the Absolute exls'tenoe’, 
offers a theory of the conquest of evil in 'the thinking of 
the Supreme Self, of an affirmation of evil which makes for 
a greater good.^^^ Disappointment, however, awaits the
140. Royce, "Spirit of ?todern Philosophy", p, 440 seq. etc.
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student who looks for an' explicit and' satisfactory threshing 
out of the metaphyslcaj nature of mbral value. Royce himself 
does not seem to recognize fully^that whereas he attempts to 
draw inference’ from his fundamentals, he actually resorts to 
postulation. He tries to combine an absolutist metaphysics 
with an ethical perfectionlfet*6 faith, although the two are no 
logical kin. He would have us believe that the presence of 
badness on the doorstep of consciousness and that temptations 
to wrong-doing are goods in disguise, binoe the person who 
bears hardship nobly and who overcomes the besetting temptation 
is strengthened in his character.
Now, there are at least two possible criticisms of such a 
line o^peculation. In the first place, it neglects the fact 
that often the actual effect of the presence of badndss and the 
occurrence, of temptation is not to ennoble, but to degrade, the 
finite individual under consideration. If it is fdir to 
reason that, as certain evils in the life of the finite 
individual ultimately make for righteousness or for strength 
of character, so we may suppose the Absolute to Tbe Consclotis 
of sin and suffering in a "conquering way";'* If it 'Is fair 
to rbdson -to the goodness of the Absolute through our observation 
of the experience of these mortal men, why is it not equally 
fair to' reason to the badness of the Absolute, on the basis
141. Note; I have not yet found, in "Spirit of Jtodern 
Philosophy", "World and the Individual", or 
"Philosophy of Loyalty", a satisfactory answer 
to the question of the metaphysical nature -of 
value.
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of the reaction of certain other men to badness and 
tenqptation? Royoe does not bring out^ any logical 
consideration in support of his ohAice of specimens.
In other words, the metaphysical absolutism and the 
ethical perfectionism may be outwardly joined, but they 
lack the inward affinity which their outward union would
sejsm to inqply. ^
In the second place, while it would appear that values
(moral) are ways in which the self acts, the student, finds 
>
a lingering, vagueness as to whether this is the understanding 
of their nature, or whether they are "somethings" which "bear 
a relation to" the .self.
In short, Royoe either substitutes what amounts to an 
arbitrary yoking of his metaphysics and his value-theory 
for a logical working together pf ipaplicatlons, or falls to 
meet clearly and squarely the. real issue underlying, as far
as the moral field is concerned.
Rogers has called in question his treatment of the matter 
of cognitive values.without going into the .details, of 
the criticism, it suffices to not^hat the absolutist theory 
of knowledge, when it tries to handle the matter of truth 
and errot, especially when an explanation of A's detectlpn 
of an error in B's thinking is needed, falls foul. At least 
part of the difficulty, it seems to me, lies in the failure
14S. Rogers] English and American Philosophy", p.293-396
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to settle in his own (Royce's) mind whether truth is a 
"something”, as his language would. Occasionally suggest, 
or a classification of cognitive products, or a description 
of certain phases of experience, or what.
Nor does Bosanquet succeed much better, even with the
• \
advantiage of later criticism. He too holds to the doctrine 
that finite and relative experiences, however mutually 
antagonistic they may appear on the surface, are reconciled 
in one beautiful total. So erroa: and badness are not so 
serious, after all; error is finally absorbed in Truth and 
evil is swallowed up in Perfection, a higher concept than
goodness, Rogers has rightly called attention to the fact
144that in this doctrine lies "indifferentism towards evftl”,“
Pnd ag&tn, at least part of the trouble lies in a neglect to 
clear up the metaphysical status of value. ■ True, he does 
argue for its definite objective content, as opposed to finite- 
individual feeling. But farther than this he gives no 
satisfactory to the fundamental question.
Absolute idealism. In sum, as against the subjeotivism 
of the Sophist type, gives value a dignity and.standing in 
the great universe. As against pragmatism, it allows value 
to be full-grown rather than a mere perpetual development.
As against naturalism or materialism it relates values to
143. Royoe, "Spirit of Modern Philosophy", p. 13 seqq.
and elsewhere.
144. Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p.376 seqq.
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personal life of one sort or another. But her.e- the real 
contribution ends. And we have above indicatAa whe;rein 
it falls short.
(3) The tendency of materialisms, like absolute idealisms, 
has been to pay prilnary heed to a metaphysical world-view, 
and then to adjust value-theory to metaphysics as best they 
could. Sometimes consistency has compelled them practically 
to deny the existence of values, and to reduce the valuation 
process to a meaningless rattle of atorae. Perhaps the 
stubbornness of the psychological fact of valuation,- and the 
difficulties in it which have proved tO be actually insoluble 
under materialistic hypothesis, may account in some measure 
for the present-day unpopularity of bald materialistic 
philosophies. Speculation has learned that it .must reckon 
with the presence in ‘experience of yalue-judgment. common 
‘sense" insists that esty n'eighbbr who has attained the age of 
accountability and is mentally normal shull be held morally 
responsible. Coimno'n sense and speculation unite in..declarlng 
that thought" can not proceed except upon assumption.cf the 
fact ‘of a distinction between truth and. error, But rnatepia-iisme, 
with their matter and force or monism pi mhtter dx: ^nism of 
force\ and with their grim -determinism-of Jaw or .some substitute 
therefor, leave no logicsJ pltce in" the total -system reality 
'for ‘truth and error, right -and wrong, -in any usual- or proper
sense of the words.
Objectdvit.y of Value 91
A consistent materialism which denies values altogether 
will of course say nothing regarding their metaphysical status. 
On the other hand, a materialism which tries to he consistent 
and at the same time desires to incorporate values into its 
system can do so only as it neglects the questions. Indicated 
in the opening discussion of this chapter, its answers shaped 
in the* light of plain psychological science.
Hence, materialism is poverty-stricken when called upon 
for contributions toward the solution of our-main problem.
(3) Pragmatism is frankly more a theory of value than an 
epistemology or metaphysios. It considers a settlement of the 
question of cognitive values fundamental to further speculation.
A speculative method and a decision regarding the nature Eind
■»
limits of truth having been reached, the pragmatist sets about 
it to build the rest of his system after a pattern found in 
his own heart.Strictly speaking, then, there is no 
necessarily characteristic pragmatist's metaphysics or theory 
of knowledge or ethics or aesthetics", since conclusions and 
hypotheses an all these branches of investigation are subject 
to change upon the receipt of new information, and the view­
point held by any individual thinker will depend largely upon 
the peculiar combinations of information he has acquired.
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that, although 
there is nothing in their pragmatism itself tq produce it.
145. Cf James, "Pragmatism", p.52 seqq.
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two of the great pragmtlets — Schiller in Britain and 
James in America -r- have nearly the same conception 6t 
!lod, as.,a- person more than human but less than infinite.
In hie lecture on the "Moral Philosopher and the Moral . 
Life", James presents several passages-which indicate his 
wrestling with the points we have said were fundamental and 
usually unanswered. Like both, absolutist and personalist, 
he is unable to conceive of a better-and a worse except where 
there is sentient’ life.A'^® He might.have added: except 
where there is'intellectual and mopaJ freedom.
But more to our point is. the attack- of the problem of 
objectivity of value. In this he has resort to Berkelelan 
ways of thinking. Good and bad, better and worse, he says, 
"must'be realized in order to be real", Moreover, "If one 
ideal judgment be objectively better than another;,-that 
betternese -must be made flesh by being lodged cbncretely in 
someone's actual perception.. It cannot float' in the 
atmosphere, . ; . Its esse is -percipi,. like- the esse of 
the ideals themselves between which it obtains. The
perclpi of right is in the feeling of somebody that it is 
right. And not only so, but- if moral value is not to-^be 
regarded as subjective, which would imply that each Individual 
is a law unto'himself, some auper-indiViduad^man originator
146. James, "Will to -Believe"., p,189 etc.
147. Ibid. p.193-198, ‘210-314
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inferred from the main tenor of his words as he has ohaneed 
to record them. And when somebody else begins inference, 
a poselbillty of misinterpretation creeps in.
With the aid of a Berkeleian. metaphysics pragmatism can 
establish objectivity for moral values in the -feeling, or 
will-act of the Greatest Person. And it can make the 
ultimate existence of values depend upon His feeling or will 
or act. But, I repeat, the pragmatistic theory in itself 
offers no particular help upon our fundamental questions, 
where moral value is the central consideration.
The same is .true regarding aesthetic values.
On the matter of cognitive values, the very nature of 
the theory mkes it relevant. And yet, in spite of much 
speaking upon the subject of truth, pragmatists have rather 
gone around than gone into the problem of the nature of the 
objectivity of truth.
The principle is laid down that "ideas (which themselves 
are but parts of our experience) become true just In so far 
as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other 
parts of our experience", or to get on "prosperously". 
Illustrations are .offered of the concept of satisfactory 
relation or prosperous getting on; but there is no thorough 
threshing out of a standard by which aforesaid satisfactory 
relation may be tested. X is defined in terms of Y, while 
underneath the surface of thought Y remains as much an
150. Cf James"Pragmatism", p.58, 303-306, et passim
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unknown quantity as .X, and the answer to the problem is an 
eternal mystery.
Truth, we are gravely informed, is successful functioning 
of knowledge. Knowledge, in turn, is a leading of idea 
toward end-terra. Whenever, in the course of the leadings, 
an idea strikes an end-terra which satisfies or enables one to 
get on proBperously, the idea is true. So runneth the tale.
As soon as the Innocent bystander begins to inquire for 
concrete and systematic explanations of satisfaction and 
prosperity, he finds that pragmatism conveys more mystification 
i^iian enlightenment. If he could only secure definite 
Information, definite criteria for judging the entrance into 
satisfactory relations, he might discover that truth is a 
description of the place of ideas in a sum-total of all ideas 
that have entered into the experience of conscious beings, 
and that the particular ideas which deserve recognition as 
"true” are those which have had the greatest measure of 
consistency with the most ireportant of all ideas that had 
existed up to their date. Or, it might appear that the "true" 
ideas were those that most nearly agreed with the thoughts of 
the Infinite Consciousness. In either case, truth would he 
granted a dignity and standing above that of finite-individual 
subjectivity. But pragmatism as it is avoids any unequivocal 
committal upon the queries of the innocent bystander. It 
leaves him in much the predicament of the fond Orpheus at the 
exit from Hades — when he thinks he is clasping the 'object of 
hie desires, he finds his arms enclosing empty space.
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In short, even pragmatism whose central theme is truth 
and its character, fails to furnish a satisfactory contribution 
toward the solution of the fundamental puzzle of this chapter.
Notwithstanding its unsleeping hostility to absolute 
idealism and its lofty contempt fof naturalism, the new realism 
resembles both insfetartihg its philosophy with metaphysics and 
adjusting its value theory thereto. Both absolute idealism 
and neo-realism combine the theo'ry of knowledge and the ontology 
having settled these, the account of values is added as a sort 
of appendix.
Since there are rather marked differences among realists, 
it seems advisable to consider a few representatives of the 
school individually.
(A) While the center of attention in G. E, lore's 
writings is upon ethics or morale, he does handle the question 
of the cognitive values incidentally and by clear implication. 
Both goodness and truth are entities. Both are ultimate and 
indefinable.^^^ The oft-sung refrain of the "-Principia'
Ethica" is that goodness is a final and unafialysable object 
of thought which is never defined except by reference to itself. 
A mordl judgment brings together goodness and some other entity. 
True, judgments may assert either goodness-in-itself or 
goodneas-as-means '— in other phraseology, intrinsic or
151. Moore, "Principia Ethioa", sect. 5-15, esp. p.31.
Cf the disGuesion of Rogers, "English and American 
Philosophy", p.413 seq. in which is cited Moore's 
article, "The Nature of Judgment", in Mind,
N.S. vol. 8, p.176
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instrumental.gut in any case the goodness is not a 
quality of anything. It does not belong to anything, It 
is an entity in its own right.
Curiously enough, after apparently satisfying himsB^f 
that the qonception just outlined is the correct conception, 
Moore goes ahead in the remainder of his first chapter to show 
that things "possess this property" in varying degrees.153 
(Underscores mine). Upon a close study of his language, one 
concludes that he is not always clear in his own mind that 
goodness is an entity in its own right rather than a property 
of entities.
Underlying his arguments against the various species of 
naturalisms and against systems of metaphysical ethics is an 
orthodox neo-realistio purpose to give values equal rank with 
other existences'. He wants them free from any semblance of 
dependence upon or fealty to any other being. This aim is 
particularly noticeable in' the argument against hedonism.
In spite of occasional lapses from strict consiatency in 
other passages, the climax oonoluslon of the lecture on 
"The Ideal" treats personal affection and appreciation of 
beauty as the most fundamental goodnesses, and treats them 
as capable of existing apart from any other constituent of
total reality.155
153. Moore, "Prlncipia Ethlca", p.31 etc.
153. Ibid, p.36, 140 etc.
154. Ibid. Ch. iii
155. Ibid, p.188
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It is to be noted, through the preceding discussion, 
that while Moore*8 primary interest seems to be upon value 
Instead of mere metaphysics, his work amounts to a squaring 
of the value-theory with neo-realistic metaphysics, the 
latter accepted without challenge. So that, after all, the 
opening remarks on page 96rhold true of ?ioore, as well as of 
his fellow thinkers.
(B) Anyone who undertakes to appraise Bertrand Russell 
finds himself bewildered by showers of brilliancies and 
inoonsietenoies. Generalizations’ founded upon one set of 
writings may be untrue of another, from the pen of this 
versatile author. Consequently it is with fear and trembling 
that I undertake afty sort of an expbsition of him.
His famous essay on "Itysticism and Logic" commends a 
striving for ethioa.1 neutrality in construction of a world­
view, and the cultivation of a cold and scientific frame of 
mind.^^® His antagonism to emotionalism and autocratic 
subjectivisms he carries to the point of excluding value 
altogether as a factor in the calculation of a final weltan-
%
schauung, without apparent consciousness on his part that 'he 
is influenced by a species of emotion In carrying his antagonl 
to an extreme. Value is hated as only subjective. Mystics, 
pobr fools, are mistaken in believing that goodness is a' 
property of the universe in general. "Good and bad, and even 
the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are the
156, Russell, "Mysticism and Logic", p.S8 etc.
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reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part 
of the substance of things as they are in themselves
In his prefatory remarks to the 1918 volume he apologizes 
for the tendency of the "Free Man^s Worship", first published 
in 1903 or 1903, to assign objectivity to value, although he 
still clings to the practical usefulness of the attitude 
toward life which it suggests,Russell presents the 
pathetic spectacle of a philosopher who is unwilling to live 
by the implications of his iswn philosophy. With his mind he 
concludes to the subjectivity of value.Sj but his heart inpels 
him to assume S,omeasure ofn-ebjT3Stivfty'’'§yc&'diggb'pt'4pg3arso'^^^®e' 
of action to his fellow men.
Taking the chapter on "Truth and Falsehood" in the email 
popular volume, "The Problems of Philosophy", as an expression 
of his theory of cognitive values, it seems that Russell dis­
agrees with the Idealistic definition of truth as measure of 
consistency. Consistency may be allowed as a test of truth, 
but never as a description of the nature of truth. corres­
pondence with fact constitutes the essence of truth. Falsehood 
occurs when the perceiving shbject links together the terms of a 
judgment in an order different from that in which they actually 
do stand. "A belief is true when it corresponds" ... to the 
complex with which it deals. Truth and falsehood are terms to 
designate, not separate entities, but "properties of beliefs".
157. Russell, op. cit.
158. Ibid. p,v. Gf p. 56 seq. and Ch. iii entire
159. Russell, "The Problems of Philosophy", Ch. xii
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In his theory of truth, as outlined above, Russell 
could be accused of heterodoxy from the neo-rsalistio faith.
That he should have been instructed In it la evident from 
his confession that he had received help from Moore, the 
originator of the viewpoint.^®® Whatever the reason for 
inconsistency, however, it does exist. By rights, if in
, t
knowledge things actually enter into relations, if the
representative character of ideas is rejected, correspondence
would well nigh become an impossibility.
No further discussion is necessary to establish Russell's
propensity to appear a bird of many feathers, though he is
commonly classed as one of the leading neo-realista. And his
theory of value reflects his many-sidedness rather than a
resolute, persevering consistency.
(0) Among the American representatives of the school,
perry will be taken.as the beat representative. Spaulding
is so thoroughly Platonic in his theory of the objectivity
of the objectivity and essential nature of value that Instead
of devoting special space to him, I Bhali inditectly criticise
his Platonism under later heads. But Perry presents some
phases which call for individual mention.
Regarding the nature of value, he tells us that he disagrees
with his confreres Moore and Russell, in that he considers value
161"dependent on consciousness" and "a function of desire",
160. Russell, "The Problems of Philosophy", p.v
161. Perry, in Holt et al. "The New Realism", p.l40
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Now, mind as we know it in nature and in society "consists 
primarily in interested behavior" coupled with the objects 
it employs,Desire, alias Interest, governs behavior.
From these statements we must conclude that for Perry 
value is in its nature a property or attribute of a thing 
toward which an organism exhibits an acquisitive attitude.
Just how this view of the fundamental nature of value affects 
aesthetic and cognitive judgment Perry, has not made plain, ■ 
although in his discussion of truth and error he. does advocate 
a position similar to that of Russell mentioned on the preceding 
page.^^® Morality Is explained as the "massing of interests 
against a reluctant cosmosAnd this, as shown by Professor 
Brightman, implies a quantitative definition — "The more the 
better".
On the question of objectivity we are told that things 
possess value, that interests invest things with value, and so 
on. IShich implies that value is something added to the thing — 
the things could go on existing without value, but the value 
is not an independent entity.Yet Perry combats any leaning 
toward subjectivism. He tries not to let it slip in, as did 
Russell. Values are facts, hard facts, not illegitiftiately
163. Of Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p.300-303
163. Perry, "Present Conflict of Idee.l0", p. 368
164. Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p, 335 seq.
165. See quotation and discussion of Brightman in Wilm (ed)
"Studies in Theology and Philosophy", p.45 seq.
166. Of Brightman, ibid. p.46. Also Perry, ibid. p.lO
167. Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p. 10,
333 seq, etc.
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bypostasized hopes. Indeed, a hope hypoataeized without 
ontological warrant is not a real value, but only an illusory 
substitute.168 "Values are absolute fpbjectivej In the 
sense that they are Independent of opinions".
In short. Perry abandons a strict neo-xealistic creed, 
first, by assigning to value a dependence upon consciousness, 
and secondly, by making it a.property of things toward which 
the organism behaves interestedly instead of classifyin^either 
as existence or relation. He offers a theory of the nature 
of value; but the theory is not characteristically neo-realistio 
it is of a sort that might be held by the new reallem*a arch 
enemy, absolute idealism.
And after all, realism gets along better when it leaves 
the subject of values out of its reckoning.
Will personal idealisms prove any whit superior?
(5) Already it has been pointed out that the order of 
thinking in absolutisms (ideallstlcjf, materialism, and the 
new realism is from metaphysics to value. Personalistic 
systems, on the other hand, are wont to search first for 
fundamentals concerning value, .and to use th-ese in the shaping 
of a metaphysics. To be sure, another personalistic starting- 
point is in the theory of knowledge; but-directly or indirectly 
value is usually a big factor.
168. Perry^ op. oit. e.t p.339. Cf "Present Conflict of
Ideals", p.368 seqq.
169. Ibid, p.3'35 etc.
170. Gf Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God", p.38
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(A) In the peroration of his treatise on "Llfe«__, Lotze 
writes as follows: "As in the great fabric of the universe 
the creative spirit imposed on itself unchangeable laws by 
which it moves the world ofphaenomena, diffusing the fulness 
of the Highest Good throughout innumerable forms and events, 
and distilling it again from them into the bliss of consciousness 
and enjoyment: so must man, acknowledging"-the same laws, 
develop given existence into a knowledge of its value, and 
the value of his ideals into a series of external forma proceed­
ing from himself
Two or three things are clear from this and allied passages. 
For one, Lotze sees the fons et orlgo of reality in a self- 
conscious, self-directing original Person, who, in virtue of 
the faot that he is fons et origo, is superior to all other 
reality. For another,, man is made after the pattern of the 
original'person. The great task of the human race in every 
age has been to discover more completely than its predecessors 
the immutable laws imposed by the Creative Spirit upon himself, 
and to attain- liberty in the careful following of the laws.
Lotze's ideas here are somewhat more subtle than those of 
Berkeley, but on tbe whole very similar. Berkeley would 
•interpret nature, i.e. the external physical uHiverad, as' a 
language of God, to be read by whom it might please to take 
the trouble.i^otze includes in his concept not only the
171.
173.
Lotze, "IJiorooosms", vol. 1 p.401
See TOaeer's edition of "Ber)^eley's Co^lete 
vol. 1 p.S95, 317; vol. li P.^-75 seq.,
vol. ill p.244 seq.
Works",
398;
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external physical universe, hut also the world of the 
structure of thought. Implicit in his thinhing Is the 
principle that values have been infused into forms and 
events by the Creative Spifit'; It remains for man to discover 
them and make them real-in-himself.
The natural inference would be that value is an aboompani- 
ment of things and events. Things and events axe not values, 
but "conveyors"' of value, expressions of the heart'of the 
Creator. And In the expression my means of things and events 
lies the nature of value.
Values may be said *0 have an objective character in that 
their ultimate ground is outside finite 'individuals. They 
are not, as Sorley, working upon hints gained from Lotze, would 
make them, a distinct third order of reality. Rather, the 
concept of objectivity as applied to values means that a value 
is objective 'in its character as a creation of the Original 
person, which character holds good for created spirits as well 
as for Creator.
And thus far, from my viewpoint, he has run well.
(B) In the introductory paragraphs to "The Eternal Values" 
the question which it is the business of philosophy to try to 
answer is said to be; "How far have we a right to give our 
values an objective character? Must we accept as fipal
the pragmatist*8 teaching that any given value lasts only as
173. Mdnsterberg, "The Eternal Values", p.5. 
entire
Of p.1-6
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long as it subserves somebody*e purpose? What sort of a 
nature shall we attribute to value, and what validity shall 
we allow to value-judgments?
Mnsterberg is particularly interested to combat the 
theory of the pragmatists which gives value an orlgln^ln 
individual caprice. "Our things become Independent not by 
ceasing to be objects for the subject of will,, but by oeaging 
to be objects for one subject only. It has absolute existence
as soon as it can'be conceived as being by lirinciple a 
possible object for every subjectThat is, anything 
which is an object to the thought of two or more spirits, or 
t6 all spirits, is just as much a thing not-born-in-caprice 
as something which inheres in an infinite and eternal Absolute — 
by that much it becomes no longer relative and passing, but 
is "eternal".
Notwithstanding some of the peculiarities of his Fichtean 
voluntarism, I believe that In the point just brought out he 
does make a contribution toward the solution of the problem of 
the objective nature of value.
(0) We need an Absolute, declares Hocking, as a way of 
escape from the reflexive turn In our thinking. Descartes, 
Berkeley, Kant in epistemology, metaphysics, morals tried in 
vain to escape a strangling solipsism. Their fault was in 
stopping with- the that. Whereas the fact is, not thatneas.
174, Miinsterberg, op. clt. et p.96, 114 seq. Cf p.46-49 etc.
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object of common knowledge to two or more spirits.
"Instinctively ... we project beyond ourselves . . . 
whatever is sublime and holy, whatever is obligatory, , .
By use of the ontological argument the separate-from-lndividual- 
caprice character of value is defended. well known weakness
of the ontological method of proof makes unneoeesary any comment, 
except to remark that I do not take any stock in this species of 
bolster for objectivity of value,
Far stronger is the argument from the Implications of 
criticism as a common experience. Criticism does not Imply 
peevishness and selfishness and whimsicality, mere jarring and 
discord among spiri'ts. If that were all it meant, It would make 
life irrational. But it does mean, if life is rational, that 
truth and falsehood, goodness and'badness, beauty and ugliness, 
are no private illusion. they have a super-individual and a 
more than ephemeral existence. In this sense and for this 
reason values are "objective".
At this point Rocking approaches very close to the brink 
of the river of Whole-Truth.
(D) Pringle-Pattison follows Lotze*s idea that progressing 
human knowledge means deeper and deeper insight into the divine
175. Hocking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience", p.191-303
176. Ibid, esp. p.303 seq.
177. Ibid.- p,308 etc.
but consodoueness-of^thatness.^'^S And the that is a possible
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nature.'Especially ie this true In case of "Mvance 
in knowledge, or in' goodness, or in Intuitions of beauty 
and grandeur offered us'in nature or in aft, ...”
But one could wish-, as he reads page after page of 
theistic argument, that the author had stopped just long 
enough to state explicitly what he' understands to be the 
nature of value. Well along in the s'econd series of lectures 
there is a passage which contains some precious grains of 
suggestion. Valuation has a connection with want, purpose- 
and-satlsfaction, oonatlon-and-success.^’^® On any other 
basis values, become arid abstractions. But, the reader is 
left to infer just what is the essential nature of value. 
Perhaps — and I offer the opinion in all humility — value 
is to be conceived as the "representation" of a' conation or 
a purpose which has been successful, has reached its goal, 
has been "realized”.
Whatever the conception of the nature of values held by 
Pringle-Pattison, he leaves no doubt as to the meaning of 
their objectivity. "Idealism takes its stand on the essential 
truth of our judgements of value, and the impossibility of 
explaining the lower from the higher. Beauty and goodness 
are not born of the clash of atoms; they are affluences of 
something more perfect and divineOne thing is certalnr
178. Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God", p.l75
179. Ibid, p.334 seq.
180. Ibid p.42
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human nature has never consented and never will consent 
that ideals should perish, or that they should be totally 
divorced from the realm of fact. Again, the very conception 
of men as finite in contrast to an infinite signifies a 
necessary reaching-beyond, which we call grasping of an ideal. 
"Ideals would be impossible to a self-contained finite entity". 
Values could not be present to the' finite person except as he 
comes into touch with the Infinite Person. Advance in knowledge 
does not mean that something is created which has been (pardon 
the phrase.') nihil nullius heretofore. It means that something 
which has been apprehendable all the time is now for the first 
time apprehended by a finite spirit. Wherefore the so-called 
discovery of values is not creation ^ nihilo. but rather an 
ap-preheneion of what existed ready to be grasped by whomsoever 
chanced to exert himself aright. They are just as much 
objective as the Locklan primary qualities,
In sum, from the unreasonableness of tryliig to explain 
the admittedly higher by the admittedly lower, from the 
desperate tenacity with which human nature clings to the -reality 
of values, from the Implications of the concept of men as 
finite, and Implloatione of' the phenomenon of advance in 
knowledge, the conclusion is to be drawn that valued are more 
than "subjective emotions In the bystander"; they are, in 
just as real and true a sense as things, ob-jective.
181, Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God", p,238 seq.
183. Ibid. Ch. vi esp. p.l29
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As rebuttal to the proposition that values are only
«
subjective emotions of particular persons and that they are 
of nothing further than relative significance, the argument 
in Pringles-Pattison is excellent. His shortcoming lies in 
a neglect to develop the positive side of his theory; that 
is, to make the development of it explicit. Just what I mean 
here will become clearer in the second section of the present 
chapter.
(E) One element in the nature of value, according to 
Sorley, is that it cannot be predicated of the abstract; it 
belongs to persons.If persons were remove^ from the 
universe, values, would no longer remain. Sorley takes pains 
to avoid the lofty and airy conceptions of a Plato, and to 
profit by the Humean criticisms of Berkeley's type of idealism. 
Especially Is he careful to oppose the conclusion of Hume that 
only impreselone truly exist Values belong to conore'te
f
and actual persons.
A second element is that values are an- independent order 
of reality, not to be reduced to terms of either ^f the other 
two orders, of existents relations.JFurthermore, they 
are "realizable ”.^96 idealization would seem to depend upon 
human e-ffort, as apprehension of entities in the existent order
183. Sorley^ "Moral Values and the Idea of God"^ p.l38 seq..,
433 etc,
184. Of ibid, p.476 seq.
185. Ibid, p.190 seq., 317 seqq.*, et passim
((fir
186. Ibid, p.44 &eqq.
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depends upon it. His strongest argixment for values as an 
order of reality is the apparent causal effectiveness of 
values in the thing-and-person order,
Parenthetically it may be nbticed that Sorley here 
develops a germ which occurs in Lotse, and struggled again 
toward existence in Mnsterberg. But the American thinker 
left it in only embryonic stages,^®®
Sorley takes pains to point out the difference between 
relations and values.^®® The heart of it is that whereas 
relations are found primarily ^ rebus, values ‘are made manifest 
PS^Bonis, Both may enter into abstract propositions, yet 
each is really meaningless unless it has to do with its other 
proper order of reality.
Before undertaking his theory of the objectivity of value 
it may be fair to raise the question how far one might go if 
he followed the path Sorley has marked out. Using the 
arguments just indicated, dne might prove the fourth order of 
aq^, since acts can be said to have had an historic effect, 
they are capable of realization, they belong to persons, they 
are not private llDusions, and so on. The critic is tempted 
to wonder whether in his enthusiasm to rescue values from 
threatened extinction, he has not made them too solid and too 
thick.
18?. Sorley, "Moral Values and the Id'ea of God", p,84 seqq.
188, Cf Lotze, "Microcoemus", vol. 1 p.396 seq.;
Mfflnsterberg, "The Eternal Values", p.ll7 etc.
189. sorley, loo. cit. and p.331-338
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The conception of the objective phase of values is 
already anticipated. Objectivity does not mean lonesome 
self-subsistence, broken by occasional- asaooiationa with 
existence.On the other hand, it does mean that their 
validity is based on eotnething more rock-like than general 
acceptance by the mass of men) sonehow they must be conceived 
as belonging to the system of the universe.The arguments 
urged in support of the nature of. values as a third order of 
reality also support their claim to objectivity. And the 
animus of the arguments, as with Mdnsterberg and Pringle- 
Pattison, lies in a revolt against the relativistic quicksands 
of pragmatism or the monotonies of "heo-realism.
But once more, I question whether in his anxiety to combat 
these foes of idealism Sorley has not exceeded bounds. I doubt 
the need of hypoatasizing a principle of reason in order to give 
it standing. Yet this is the very course Sorley seems to take. 
Whereas, it appears to. me that the objectivity -of value is to 
be understood in the •same sense as the objectivity of any of 
the rest of the categories,
(F) A few brief citations from Leighton's system will 
illustrate his position.
Certain value-contents confront the individual (human) 
demanding his obedience or rejection. This is a well known 
phenomenon in the sciences of psychology and sociology.
190. Sorley, "Moral Values a.nd the Idea of God", p.l39
191. Ibid. p,3S8 etc.
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Upon observation and reflection he may grow dissatisfied 
with part of them, and proceed to alter old contents or add 
virtually new contents; or he may own unquestioning 
allegiance to contents inherited from the past. But the 
actualization of his personality — in part, at least, the 
development of self-consciousness and self-direction — is 
conditioned upon "aaelmilatlng and readting to" systems of 
value-content before him.^^S ^nd in thus reacting, he is 
not dealing with private illusion and dream. If he were, 
life would hardly be rational.^®^ "For truth, the central 
determining factor of conscious reflective life, and goodness, 
beauty, and holiness, the other determining values of 
personality, by their very nature claim to be more than 
ooGaslonal precipitations of cosmical weather. These values, 
and the conscious spirits- in which they inhere and function, 
must claim to be continuously valid principles for the Inter­
pretation of reality, and continuously effective principles
1 94in the evolution of the same reality".
Clearer still is a previous passage. "The objectivity 
of intrinsic values consists in the basic fact that only 
through the quest and possession of them can the higher life 
of selfhood be realized, . . . These values have an objective 
and constraining character; they possess over-individual 
validity. . . . The evidence for this contention la that
193. Leighton, "Ti^an and the Cosmos", Ch. xxvii
193. Ibid. p,413 seq., 504, etc.
194, ■
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without the eervice of values, without seeking and attaining
these, the higher selfhood cannot be realized, . , . The
essence of objective idealism, in contrast with subjective
idealism,* or mentalism, is the acceptance by the self of the
valid authority and reality of an objective order of Values".
In short, Leighton brings to birth truths that had been
left in embryonic stages by MCtnsterberg and Pringle-Pattison
and Sorley. 'He states plainly what he understands to be the
nature of value, and its significance in the total system.
He puts into words implied conceptions behind the thinking
of his predecessors, conceptions an explicit working out of
which we missed in their writings.
He has anticipated almost exactly my own theory regarding
%
objectivity of value.
b. Metaphysical implications of the theory of value as a
category; validity of the contents of the value experienc_e.
In an earlier chapter we took note of the fact that the
essential feature of the value experience is the attitude of
196welcome or the reverse toward an item of experience. And
we saw that in spite of disputes as to mutual relations of 
values in many fields, in spite of other developments in the 
history of thought, every important system has admitted, 
tacitly or openly, the fact of value-judgment.
It is the implications of this item of experience, the
195. Leighton, "mn and the Cosmos", p.4C6 seq.
196. Supra, p.56-59
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eignificance of the admitted fact, which has caused the real 
difficulties.
Accordingly It is ray purpose now to consider what is 
implied,- metaphysically, in the theory of value as a category 
of knowledge. I shall first set forth my own conclusions as 
to the "whether and wherein" of objectivity; and then examine 
a few subsidiary questions.
Incidentally, a warning. Much of the disagreement as to 
the validity and-objectivity of value has been due to the 
failure of philosophers to keep steadily before them the 
distinction between the value-form and the products of the 
value-judgment. Pragmatists have had in mind the latter;
some Idealists and some neo-realists have dealt primarily with 
the former, although many wot it not. Most have failed to 
make notable progress because of entanglements in vagueness.
I have tried to make it clear that value is fundamentally 
a from in which knowledge is cast. That is, it ought to be 
so considered, under a personalistio whole-theory. Which 
means, that the question of the objectivity of the value-form 
is in no wise to be confused with the question of the validity 
of particular value-judgments. And it is the study of the 
form which now interests us.
The great founder of the Academy vaouum-ized his abstractions 
to such a high degree that objectivity came to mean oorapleteness 
of separation from taint of the particular. But the attributing
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of ®thinghood" coupled with the process of abstraction, high
abstraction, brought serious difficulties into speculation.
One need go no farther than certain passages in.the "Protagoras"
197to see that Plato felt himself still somewhat In the quicksand.
Very recently we saw some oompllcatlons In the theory of 
a twentieth century Idealist that values are a third order of 
reality.^®® He, like most ohjeotlvlsts, looks at the function 
side, while combatting relativists who (he does not seem fully 
to realize) are looking at the content side.. Or, he Iboks at 
the goal toward which knowledge Is progressing, and by faith 
sees it, while they are most deeply Impressed with the fa£t of 
progression and dwell upon the spectacle of the mile-posts along 
the road, skeptical as to whether the road itself has any end.
Vfhatever of objectivity attaches to a category, under the 
Whole-Idea of personalism, is distinctly not a matter of order 
of existence. Herein a thorough-going personalism differs 
with an idealist like Sorley as well as with the entire school 
of neo-realists. Personalism requires no more than two orders 
of reality, persons and their acts. And while the categories 
are In one sense "real", as real as persons and acts, they are 
not to be classed with the other two in an enumeration of 
orders of reality. Categories as principles of knowledge and
act are unique,
197. Plato, "Protagoras", sect. 339-334
198. Supra p.l09 seq.
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Positively, then, objectivity resolves itself into universality. 
That is subjective which is peculiar to one individual; that 
is in some degree subjective which occurs in the case of a 
limited number of individuals, A thing or experience or form 
of experience which is common to two or more' persons is in that 
measure objective. And if the commonness extends to all persons, 
objectivity is complete.
Unless my neighbor's experience is oast in a form similar 
to mine, there can be no com-municatlon between us. Because 
^ his ideas are past in time-form, being-form, value-form and so 
on, association is possible. -We can compare the "passing" of 
time because we both build up knowledge under a time-form.
We can compare estimates of quality because we both think under 
the quality-form. And so on. . Time, therefore, is objective 
in that it is not an idiosyncrasy, but a universal principle 
for the organization of experience. And value is objective 
in the same way, if it be agreed, as we tried to prove in our 
third chapter, that the value-judgment enters into every state 
of conaclousneea; or even if it be allowed as an element in 
the experience of every person.
But objectivity means more than universality. It signifies 
that the so-called goals of value-judgment in the various fields 
are neither illusory nor irrational. In other words, there is
a truth and a beauty and a right. If there were not, these 
ways of valuation would be absurd and totally pointless.
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Particular value-judgments strive toward tbe igoal, the 
existence of which is of course a, matter of faith rather 
than of sight. 'Wherefore a given value-judgment may. be — 
nay, ^ — as the pragmatists Insist, partial and incomplete,
subject to revision. But in order, to make the striving a 
rational act, there must be a value-goal ahead. Not ahead 
in time or space, but logically. It is to be understood. A 
pronouncement of aesthetic judgment could be no better than 
idiotic gibberish if there were not a beauty-goal ahead.
In the sense that the form is universal, and that the goal 
toward which particular judgments strive is no illusion, I 
take value to be objective.
Next, the subsidiary questions.
Of these, first: how are "criteria of value" to be
understood, in the light of this theory? Answer: as usually
employed, the term "criterion of value" has had to do with
fundamental valuations by which particular value-jud^^enta
are measured. sometimes, as in the case of Leighton, it has
199applied to the ground of existence of the value—form. A
personalist may take it in either meaning, according to his 
nnrpose, without affecting his'theory that value is essentially 
a form of thought.
A second question refers to "realization" of values. 
Whether we believe that values are "realized" or "created"
199. Leigh'fco.n, "Man and the Cosmos", p,207 seq.
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makes little difference to the personarist when he thinks 
profoundly. To be sure, he doea not necessarily conceive 
values as. a third order; hence he does not think of them 
as apprehended on the analogy of the way in whlchr things are 
perceived. Rather, realization of values means that the 
value-form of knowledge more and more nearly approximates 
the goal which faith asserts is yonder. And creation 
values would mean that new steps, toward the goal had been 
taken. In no case need realization be understood, as Sorley 
sees it, -as. Aristotle *e form-to-matt.er process. Repeat!^ an 
observation made on prlngXe-Pattison, I believe that the 
discovery of values is not creation ^ nihilo. But whereas 
the great British thinker holds to ap-prehension of what already 
existed, I regard "discovery” as a figurative way of expressing 
"step-forward".
The third question has to do with value and religion. 
Religion is said to be a conservator of values, a source of 
values, and so forth.And, correctly. For while Professor 
Brlghtraan very properly contends that not everything valuable 
is true, nor everything that Is true valuable, in certain 
senses of the words, while it is also true that religion should 
not be expected to produce all kinds of value; it ^ true, as 
he potilita out, that an intimate relation does exist between 
religious truth and value. — the conoern of religion Is with
300. E.g. Hocking, "Meaning of Ood in Human Experience", 
p.462
/
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OATtrue values.Ideas and systems of knowledge upon the 
religious phase of total 'experience are pair excellence value- 
judgments.
The last question has to do with the origin ana ground 
of value. Personalism has a quick answer. Not only is the 
universe of persona and things grounded in a supreme Person, 
but* the forms of reality (the categoafies, if you pl-ease) have 
their ground and raison d^etre'.ln His will and purpose. He 
is not bound by them as by something foreign and strange, but 
they are forms of Hie own affirmation. j-t ^9 that hath
made them, and not they themselves.
Certain other implications of the theory will be aonsldered 
in a chapter by themselves.
SOI. Brightman, ’’Truth and Value in Religion”, art. in
Methodist Review vol. cv (Jan.-Feb.11933) p,42-47
Cf Pringle-Pattlson, "Idea of God", p.340; and the 
writings of Bowne and Ladd and any of the rest 
of the thelstlc idealists.
202.
Chapte'r VI
VALtJE AND CERTAIN .OTHER CATEGORIES
It remains to consider the relations and differences 
between value and certain other categories, in the light 
of the theory advanced by this the'els. The following will 
be treated briefly, in the order named: being, quantity, 
quality, time, causality, purpoa'e.
a. Being. Two remarks on this head, of which the first 
concerns a distinction in terminology. On the pages of 
Mdnsterberg the term value is about equivalent to "product of 
the act of will". For him the fundamental act of will is 
evaluation. But when we follow out the development of his 
thought in "The Eternal Values", when we examine the list of 
twenty-four values enumerated, it appears that the values are 
more nearly categories of knowledge than values in the distinctive 
sense of the word. For example, one of the primary valuations 
is under the head of being — being is "a value".
Now, the foregoing discussions have made it clear that 
value, rightly taken, in^llee the attitude of welcome, or the 
reverse, toward the vanious items of experlifence. And I cling 
to the literal usage, quite different from the adapted 
meaning assumed by MiSnsterberg, For me, value and being are 
both of the nature of categories, each having as good a right
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as the other to category standing.
My second remark centers around Sorley'e position that 
being la a logical pre-requisite to value. "1/fhen we predicate 
goodness or 6ther value”, he argues, "it is always predicated 
upon the assumption or on the hypothesis of existence. The 
existence need not be actual or present; but it is only as 
existing — or if it exists — that the thing is held to 
be good".^®^ Which might be Interpreted to mean that as a 
logical presupposition to every value-judgment there is an 
exietence-judgment. Or it might mean that existence-judgments 
are pre-sumed in ay. value-judgments, actually (without any . 
explicit or implied pronouncement upon their logical connections).
Supposing him to mean the former, I agree that in our 
experience of experience (if the phrase may be permitted) 
valuation always has reference to -something supposed to be 
”there", either actually or potentially. But empirical 
actuality and logical neeessity are two different matters.
If, as one might gather from the general drift of hie expositions, 
Sorley holds to a logically necessary connection, to that 
extent I disagree with him. For, although in practice value 
does take for granted the existence of the thing valued, I can 
see no logical implication of existence in value, any more than 
in time and space and number. All are forms in which intelligent
303. Sorifey,■"Moral Values and the Idea of God", p.83 
Of p.83-85
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caste knowledge, and no one properly assumes any other. In 
short, his anxiety to rescue values from neo-rea.listic limho 
and establish them in the realms of real reality has led Sorley 
to extremes here, as in some other places.
Quantity, Daily life- is full of such expressions as, 
"This vase is more beautiful than that", "My statement has in 
it more of truth than does the statement of my neighbor", 
'"Suph-and-such is better than such-anotherMen talk as 
though there were degrees in aesthetic and cognitive.‘and moral 
values. Can it be that there are degrees in the value-judgment 
itself? What is the relation of the categories of quantity 
and value?
Some confusion will be eliminated when it is remembered 
that discrimination should always be made between the form of 
thought, and judgments made under that form. Judgments made 
under one form may at the same time be made under-another, in 
actual practice. But through all, the two forms remain just 
as distinct as ever.
Degrees of value, so-called, appear when two value-judgments 
are brought together under the form of a third value-judgment.
In each case, the value-form perseveres. And this holds true 
in spite of the fact that word-statements often have a surface 
simplicity which at first baffles the analytic efforts of 
thought. Time measurement reduces Itself to a comparison of
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successions; and successions are realiy Judgments under t'he 
time-form; which judgments are brought together in a third 
judgment, stil'l under the time-form. Similarly, value 
measurement reduces to a comparison of oughts.
Thus, there is a present value-judgment. It fs brought 
into comparison with an accepted value-judgment, known as the 
criterion. The act of comparison is itself a value-judgment, 
in which the former is rated as welcome or the reverse, 
according as it approximates to a greater or lees degree the 
latter.
Wherefore, tiie phrase "degrees of value." Intends not a 
crass and literal situation in which somethings corresponding 
to. the mind's value-judgments are So related that their 
difference may be expressed in number. What it does signify 
is that the quantl$y-form furnishes a figure of speech by 
which to express the relation of terms in a super-judgment* of 
the value-form, just as the spaoe-form furnishes the basis of 
many expeesslons which logically have the time-form.
c. Quality. Quality is primarily a category for phyeioal 
things, a form for the organization of sense-perceptions, a 
principle whereby the mind apprehends on the basis of how-things- 
affeot-the-physical-sensibillty. Bowne, to be sure, believes 
that because so much of our thought Is occupied with experiences 
on the sense-plane, we are apt wrongly to conceive qualities in
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passive and spatial ways; whereas, he argues, "as the thought 
of "being grows more dynamic, or as we rise to the conception 
of spiritual being, our thought of the qualities take® on the 
form of powers, energies, capacities, faculties, etc."^^^
Even at that, color and timbre are apprehended uhder a different 
category than truth and beauty.
On the other hand, I can not agree with Leighton that the 
category of value has no application "to the interpretation of 
physical thingsFor, as we demonstrated in an earlier 
chapter, every judgment is oast in the value-form along with 
some other fo'rm,^^® Interwoven in the act of mind which can 
be described as this-quality-is, there is another element 'of 
thle-quallty-ought-or-ought-not-to-be. Value and quality, 
far from being confined to separate realms of physical and 
mental, both have jurisdiction in both realms, although quality 
operates in the mental kingdom-with less assured right than in 
the physical.
If a genealogy of the categories were to be arranged, being 
and quality would be rated as more closely akin to each other 
than either one to value. And while quality and value may 
have strong facial resemblance (to borrow a figure from the 
family photograph album), a careful blood test would reveal 
the distinctness in their genealogical strains. Changing the 
figure, value is the morepneat^y indispensable servant of mind.
304, 'Bowne, "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", p.87
305, Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", p.lB3
306, Supra p,56-59
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d. Time. In following di'souaeions such as that of 
G. E. Moore on the subject of'metaphysical ethics, or, that 
of Rogers in his critioism of T. H. Green, whether or not one 
agrees with the'positions of thw writers in question, he must 
conclude that the problem of the relationships between time 
and value is not so easily solved as might be supposed; that 
in fact it is full of subtle perplexities.
Has time anything whatever to do with "values"? Are. 
values eternal? Can they be eternal and have any meaning
for us mortals? , Can the'y have a'ny meaning for us mortals 
unless they are eternal? Do degrees of value- depend upon 
time? These and many similar queries arise 'in the mind of 
the investigator.
The second and third questions just raie'ed''Moore would 
answer in one way, and Mdnsterberg -in quite the opposite.
And Moore would reply to the fourth with a'decided negative.
The difficulty in both cases lies in a failure to realize 
that the essential nature of value Is categorical. Motwith— 
standing his intention to think of value in a somswhat 
categorical sense, Mdiisterberg forgets himself and -surreptiously 
drags in a conception of values as having a sort of substantive 
nature. Moore frankly assumes that they have subetantivity 
which evolves, but which Could’not evolve through human 
channels if they wefe "eternal"', l.e. if they were'not Subject
307. Of Moore, "PrlnOlpia Ethica", sect.70^ p.,118-131;
Rogers, "English and American Philosophy", p.S3S-348
208. Of Moore, lo. cit.
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to the regulations -of time. Each quite properly points out 
weak spots in the theory of the other; and each, by a process 
of elimination of alternatives, settles down to his own 
viewpoint. The Innocent bystander can appreciate the weak­
nesses of the two contraries. He can discern the need for 
some theory of value and time which will avoid the difficulties 
of both alike,
Prlngle-Pattlson, in a fine literary passage, contends 
that the good and the beautiful *'are in their very nature 
eternal because they are not actually created by man, shaped 
by him out of nothing and added hencefoi^th to the sum of 
existence.He Is prevented fronj making, the progress for 
which Kant opened his way by his bondage to the Platonic 
conception of the good and the beautiful. Re can not get 
clear of a belief in their substantive nature. Hence, his 
idea of the relationship between time and value is that values 
are "eternal” — they ante-date man and earth-crust and 
primeval mist, they are entitles which coexist with the original 
World Ground. All three of the thinkers cited have difficulty 
because of their assumption, conscious or unconscious, that 
values are substantive or quasi-substantive.
Another sort of difficulty is Illustrated in Kant and 
some of his successors, from whom we choode Sorley for an 
example. For the teacher of Kdnigsberg, an eternal process
809. Pringle-Pattison, "Idea of God", cf. p,154
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Is necessary to the realization of the lEoral ideal. And 
hy "eternal” is meant'without ending in time,210 ‘ Sorley 
shahply criticised the Spencerian theory that time is a test 
of goodness,- holding on the contrary’that gbodnese iS' foot­
loose from time. Ethical ideas, for instance, are never to 
be measured in time terms, althoUgli they are fdLctore in the 
shaping of reality "as minifested in time".^^^ Says he in 
the concluding paragraph-of "Mofal Values and the Idea of God": 
"As long 8.8 the time-process continues can conceive free 
minds as working towards the goal of moral perfection; we can 
even think of them .as, them'selves i&ade perfect, still pressing 
forward into new and unttied ways, enhancing thC values of the 
world",
Underlying these fefeBdstfhenta is a theory that many values 
are not-yet, ^but perhaps-Sodn-tc-be. Values are entities, 
either having-besn-creatCd or 'to-be-created. Before they ' 
have been created they Ohn hardly "be described Under the 
category of being; afterward, the category of "being applies. 
Since these things are true, time is necessary in-which to 
"realize" values. , . . Now, a critic can snap the thread 
BO skilfully spun by asking‘what iS"'the'natureof the entities 
created, and how th'ey d're' different before and after being 
•"realized". He can show that it is by a species of metpnymy
310. Of Mackenzie, "Eternity", art, in Hastings (ed.)
Encyclopedia of Religion and EthdoS, vol. v p.401
211, Sorley, "filoral Values and the Idea of God", p.61, 187
213, Ibid, p.509, 511-516
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that the product of the value-judgment is accounted blood
kin of the value principle in knowledge,. The phrase
"realization of values" is a po.etic figure, not a strict
scientific description. The assertion, "Such-and-such a
value was realized, in such-and-such a perspn at such-and-such
a time under such-and-such .circumstances", is only the ^sort
!
of judgment we described in an earlier section of the ohai)ter
as an Instance of value-measnrement.
I do not mean to deny that the something which the
judgment expresses has really o’courred. Certainly, it did
occur. But: what really happens when we think we perceive
a "realization" of values is a succeseion of^®vente expressed
in a series of judgments of the value type; these value-
judgments are related in a series of comparison judgments
(or conceivably, in a single comparison judgment); yet value
never loses its character as primarily a principle of organization
of knowledge. "Realization of value", "creation of value",
then, are succinct metaphorical phrases to express a series
of events (or conceivably, a single event) which is apprehended
by value-ju^^ment tending in a certain direction.
The foregoing discussion anticipates part pf my constructive
\
theory. Before continuing with it, I pause to remark upon one
or two ideas advanced by Leighton.
His closing chapter in "Man and the Cosmos" calls attention, 
among other things, to the persistence with which the religion of
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men affirms the more than passing' character of deeds -and 
'achievements which valuevcomparison assigns to’ the plus 
class.Herein he i-s not; inoonsiptent with the position 
I have just been taking.
And yet he is not fully clear. Turning back to the 
discussion of ]9Pjsrfeotion and Evolution-", one finds many a’ 
sentence and phrase echoing the: hypothesis of the substantive 
character of yalues.^^^ There are said to be "prlhclples of 
value" which exist in an organic whole, which "persist of 
continue" throughout change.(Underscores mine-). The 
organic whole' of spiritual values ?ie the ground of the- harmony 
between the values or meanings of finite psychical centers 
And more to the same effect. . .' . Again, on its surfao'e the 
position taken by Leighton la not inbonsistent with that which 
I have been assuming. On the Other hdnd, under the eyes of* 
some interpreters, it might seem radically opposed. The 
trouble is that Leighton is not fully clear in bringing ou't 
certain of the implications of his system,
A brief statement-, now, will suffice to 'explaih my o'wn 
theory.
In the first place, the "values'" about* which so much debate
313. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", cf p.546
314. Ibid. Ch. xxxvii
315. Ibid. eap. p.513
216. Loo. cit.
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arises- are neither things -nor events, nor anything analogous 
thereto. But, as time has its hours and seasons and years; 
as space has its paint and line ‘and plane and solid; so value 
has its truth and beauty and goodness. In each "-case, experience 
organized under the category takes characteristic ‘forms, and 
it does so independently of ‘the interference, or operation of 
a factor called time. Apprehension Of a thing as solid-in- 
spatial-form may concur’ with apprehension as. appearirig-at-h- 
certain time; but the'spatial phas’e of the process or act of 
apprehension has nothing to do with the time phase. And 
similarly, the value phase is independent of the time phase.
Time no more affects beauty than an hour affects a line, although 
a beautiful thing may be created at a certain time. Time is 
not a mediiUm in which values are Teallzed, as soil and warmth 
and moisture: and light constltitte a medium in which -seeds grow. 
(This figure must not be made to go on all fours). When we 
"perceive anr"advance in,morality]*,what has happened epistemologic?-!! 
ally is that two or mone value-judgments have been' related 
under both value-form and time-form. The phrase "advance in 
morality" is a short, symbolical expression, simple' on its face, 
but referring to a fact which is far ia)re complex logically 
than at flrs*^ appears.
In short, there is no logical or metaphysical relation 
between time and value. Logically, there might be truth 
wh'ether there were years or not; and vice versa.
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As was brought out In the orltloiem of Sorley. the 
phenomenon of progressive realization of values, whether 
the ethical or cognitive pr aesthetic he in mind, is to he 
explained as experience organized in accorslanoe with the time 
and value categories, both categories being necessary to the 
apprehension of the event or events, but neither category being 
essential to the other, judging from the logical standpoint. 
"Realization of values" is a figure of speech denoting a serlep 
of events which is apprehended in a v^ue-judgment tending in 
a certain direction.
Such phrases, then, as "eternal values" and "temporal 
vpilues" are not to be taken too literally. For, ps. a certain 
racial habit "measures" time in terms of space facts, so an 
unratlonallzed thought custom expresses degrees of value in 
terms of the time aide of experience. But an attempt to 
justify the racial habit and the thought custom soon leads 
into a veritable labyrinth of difficulties.
Ifhat of the "eternity" of values, their "persistence", 
and so on? Answer; as soon as the categorical nature of 
value is clearly perceived, such a question appears as childish 
as, "^ich would you rather do, or drag a board?" As Leighton 
has demonstrated, some things which we by metonymy denom.lnate 
values are time-transcending. Hence, if only we understand 
what we mean, there is no harm in saying that values persist,
that they are eternal.
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e. Causality. In his effort to disprove the relative 
and illusorv character of value, Parley tends to give the 
impression that he regards values as causally efficient in 
the general world of realities. For him, the orders of
existents, relations, and values may interact. At least, 
so his language often Implies,
Yet even Sorley drops hints that the true causal efficacy 
lies rather in the wills of living persons, free wills, than 
in "mere" values. For while, as Hooting puts it, "an
alteration of value is an alteration of conductthe will 
chooses from posslhilitiee before It, which one of them ife 
shall accept as guide. Nor is it enough to say with the 
realists that "interests operate, that things tate place 
because of the good they pronxitesince in this statement 
we have dodged the metaphysical- question at issue, or have 
replied with a positivistic no-answer.
On the other hand, it must never be forgotten that the 
concept of value, like any other concept, belongs primarily 
in the realm of epistemology, not of metaphysics. Caution 
must always be -observed lest thought hypostafeize the concept in 
an attempt to see values as "causes"; -metaphysically speaking.
317. Sorley, "Moral Values and the Idea of God", p.35,
64 seqq., 184-189 etc.
318. Ibid. p.35. Of p.283-491^ 497 seq.
319. Hooking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience",
p.140-144 Ch. xxxl etc.
320. Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", p.340-344
etc.; cf the remarks of Mneterberg, "The
Eternal Values", p.3 45
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Accordingly the fact is, not that values are causes, 
hut that the acts of living persons show a certain between 
their value-judgments and their will-decisions. If there 
were genuine causal connection between values and events, 
we should expect to find morality more uniform than it is 
in this world. Ethical laws would vary no more in the minds 
of men than does the law of gravitation in the minds of 
physicists. But the hard fact remains that on the content 
side morality and ethics do vary, and ths.t right widely, 
wherefore we are thrown bade to a -theory of value ano. causality
both as categories of the knowledge process. And neither
{
in any sense conditions the other.
f. Purpose. spontaneously and immediately the mind 
relates time and space sequences under the catego^r of 
causality. And as knowledge widens, this spontaneous relating 
tends to knit a greater and greater proportion of the items 
of experience Into one all-inclusive causs-1 system. Uatural- 
istlc philosophy is content to stop at this point, overlooking 
the fact that causality is primarily a category of description 
instead of a theory of explanation, under its view. Some 
defenders of naturalism, realizing the need of something 
deeper, and awed by the. mftgniflcenoe of the system constructed 
under the principle of causality, feel that it would be 
disrespectful,' or at least too naive, to use any feature of 
the workings of their mind.8 as a olue to the Interpretation
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of the great system. Hense, purpose is rejected, or at 
test is reserved in tte class of finite phenomena. And 
necessity becomes the theory of explanation.
How if' necessity be adopted, as the ultimate concept 
for the explanation of the universe, and of experience, then 
of course all possibility of free a-otion .is ruled out. And 
if freedom be not a fact, then purpose in any true sense of 
the word can not exist. And if purpose be no reality,, then 
value-judgment is pointless. For the very ratio essendl of 
value-judgment is the shaping of-purpose-. The interpretation 
of a world of necessity would xsqulre neither the categories 
of freedom nor value. In a universe of things-as-«hey-are 
no genuine altbrnatlves are possible; hence, there oan intrude 
no such thing as welcome or the reverse. Welcome would be 
irrational and meaningless. In short, value would be sheer
illusion.
on the other hand, the explanation of the causally related 
system by the category of purpose not only admits, but it 
demands, the category of value, for reasons already suggested. 
"Everywhere the mind seeks to relate its objects as means and 
Qnd".231 pre-requisite to the relating as means and ends, 
however, is organization on the principle of value. So that, 
although he does not work it out quite as I have done here, 
Leighton is correct in his contention, along with Bqsanquet,
321. Bowne, "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", p.107 
Cf Pringle-Pattieon, "Idea of God’, On. xvii
etc.
etc.
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that "the notions of purposive striving, willing, of ends 
and means, are suhordinated to the notions of value and 
personalityPutting it bluntly, the category of value 
is a logical prlua. to the category of purpose. On the 
subjective side, evaluations precede and furnish a guide 
boaid''"for purposes; my purposes would be p. mockery except, 
as they had foundation in value-judgments. In my apprehension
o? the outer world of'persons and things^ I. would be unable 
to cbmprehend mnifest purpose except in- the light of ^ 
evaluations which ■! infer or postulate- them to have made.
‘The category of value, I repeat, is a logical prius 
to the category oX purpose’. '
f *
233. Leighton, "Man and the Cosmos", p.213. Of p.209-313. 
Many quotations from Bos&’nQuet,* ^principle of 




Personalism la the philosophy which looks to personality 
for the key to the solution of the mysteries of life and the 
eternal metaphysical puzzles. Its emphases are a reaction 
t<^ertain phases of sensationali-sm, of absolute idealism, 
of cosmic evolution (Spencer's), and of materialism and 
positivism. Among Its fundamental tenfets are Is the theory 
that knowledge is an orderly apprehension of reality, made 
possible through the immanent presence in the mind of forms 
or principles of organization called categories.
In the past, personalisms have been inclined to neglect 
a study of the fundamental nature of value.
For personalism, the sel-f is a primary faot. It is 
identical and persistent throughout changes of experience; 
it is active, its freedom is axiomatic, and it is a true 
individual. It is the being "has experience". It is a 
"seer which, unseen, sees".
Among the arguments for the existence of the self 
are such facts as the implicit assumption of a self in 
the writings even of sensationalism and materialism, the 
nature of a simple judgment which requires a unitary 
perceiving subject in whom the terms of the judgment are
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brought together, and a rational explanation of the 
phenomenon of plurality.
This theory differs from absolute Idealism in that 
the latter gives a lessened significance to the filiite 
Individual. Xt is opposed to the plank in the platform 
of the new realism which dfscounts privacy and virtual 
inaccessibility of each mind, and to the tendency of 
realists to adopt behaviorism. It also disagrees with 
the realistid conception of space a:nd time as real existences 
the "elements" of which are revealed by analysis.
That side of experience which* includes the' aftitude 
of welcome or the reverse toward items presented to 
consciousness is what we Include in 'the meaning of the 
word "value".
In spite of the differences in value-judgments in 
the economic and the. biological-survival 'and -the ethical 
and the aesthetic and the cognitive departments of 
experience, all such judgments have'an aspect’ of welcome 
or the reverse. In all the debates in the history of 
thought concerning mutual relations of the various kinds 
of value, the fact of the welcome-attitude remains 
unchallenged. For thebe reasons an Inclusion of aspects 
of experience within the meaning of value — aspects of 
the varieties we have named — is justified.
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Valuations are not simply additions to facts. They 
are integral parts of the co^ltive process. Prohahly 
no state of consciousness is without its value aspect, an^ 
more than it is without its being aspect and possibly its 
time aspect. Observation and reflection confirm the 
conclusion that value-judgment is universal.
The personalistic theory of knowledge as being in its 
nature an orderly arrangement of^ experience after the 
pattern of categories Immanent in the mind, and as due to 
the activities of a self, are the explanation of the 
differences between its value-theory and the theories of 
philosophical viewpoints of other schools.
Various idealisms have been feeling their way toward 
the conception of value as a category, but it is only 
recently that clear and thoroughgoing treatments have 
appeared. Among these is Leighton, whose theory my o'wn
very closely resembles,
Mjr argument for the categorical nature of value may 
be summed up In the following propositions; first, every 
state of consciousness as we actually know it not only has 
the being element and possible the time element, hut also 
the aspect of this-ought-to-be or this-ought-not-to-be for 
such and such reasons; secondly, no state of consciousness 
lacks this aspect, whatever else besides the being aspect it
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may not have; thirdly, however great the disagreements 
regarding value-ultlmates, the value-form never is called 
in question; finally, every definition of value is 
oiroular — it requires itself to explain itsfelf.
In the light of these considerations, I come to the 
conclusion that VALUE IS A CATEGORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
Two main questions are uppermost in discussions of 
the metaphye(i$al character of value. One concerns the 
fundamental nature of value, and the other its ultimate 
significance.
Some absolute idealisms tend to reduce positive and 
negative values to one class, the positive. Others are 
unclear on the matter of the nature of value^ But all, 
or practically all, contend for the pternal and un-relative 
sigMficanoe of values in the total system.
Consistent materialism and consistent neo—realism 
have difficulty with the value problem, though for slightly 
different reasons. And pragmatism, on account of its 
relativistic leanings, offers little help toward the final 
solution of the two central problems.
On the other hand, idealisms (particularly the type 
we have called pereonalistic) draw on the fundamental facts 
of the value-experience for material in the construction of 
their metaphysics.
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As we have already tried to show, from a peraonaliet*s 
angle, value la in its esaentlal nature a category of 
knowledge.
furthermore, it has a true objective validity, of the 
same sort that attaches to any of the rest of the categories. 
TShen one considers that the value-judgment is universal in 
human experience; and when he remembers that unless the 
value-form were common to both of us, my neighbor and I 
would be unable to talk and exchange ideas in terms of value; 
when one considers the implication of these facts, he is 
compelled to admit that value is hot relative, it is not 
private illusion, but it is objective.
In the light of this theory, "realization of values" 
means that partiouaSir value-judgments reach towards a goal, 
for the existence of which the evidence is faith.
And the origin and ground of values la the Supreme Person.
There remain a few questions about the relationships 
of value and certain other categories.
Care must be exercised to make clear distinction between 
value on the one hand, and such categories as being and 
quality and perhaps quantity. Value is separate from and 
independent of everyone of these. Nor does quantity "assist" 
value in the formation of the concept of degrees of value — 
the concept is constructed on the value principle alone.
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Arguments oonoerning the relative or eternal nature' 
of values would seem to Involve a relationship "between 
time and value. To the same end might the concept of 
"realization of values" appear. But as soon as It Is 
clearly seen that values are neither things nor events; 
and that as time has its hours and years, so value has 
its truth and goodness — the question of temporality of 
values loses its point. Values do not depend upon time.
Causality, like being and quality, is a separate and 
independent category, in no wise logically linked with, value.
Purpose, however, would be meaningless apart from an 
assumed valuation. Hence, the category of value may be 
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